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ABSTRACT 
 
Volatile and rising energy prices have made consumers aware of their opportunity 
costs for energy. Information on the cost-savings of energy efficient features in homes has 
not been well researched to date and is an option for consumers in the marketplace. The 
purpose of this thesis is to empirically investigate whether energy efficient features influence 
the sales price of Austin residential single-family homes. The data for this study comes from 
the Austin Board of Realtors multiple listing service database. The results should be 
applicable to other US cities with similar climate. 
This study examines over 800 single family residences in the Austin, Texas real estate 
market from 1998-2004. The dataset contains green and non-green rated homes as well as 
twelve energy features for homes.  Log-Linear regression was used to explain the variation of 
sales price, while factor analysis was used to reduce the number of correlated energy 
variables into groups of factors.  The results of the regression concluded that homes in the 
Austin metro area with efficient heating ventilation & air conditioning systems and controls 
sell for 4% more than homes without these features. Pricing of other related energy features 
commanded a price discount on the home.  
In conclusion, more efficient heating & ventilation features of new homes in Austin, 
Texas exert a positive influence on home prices.  At least for this market, consumers appear 
to recognize and pay for this form of expected future energy savings.   
 
Key Words: Energy efficiency, energy policy, green homes, green rating, sustainability 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
The conversation about energy efficient homes and the consumption of utilities has 
been a topic that has phased in and out of US agenda in the government and private sectors 
for about 40 years with the advent of the US importing more energy than it produced in the 
early 1960s (Energy Information Agency, 2005).  The conversation on energy intensified 
with the 1973 oil crisis and again recently with sharply rising energy prices. Since the early 
1990s an increasing concern about the environment has surfaced. The arrival of “Energy 
Star” (est. 1992) products and homes further stimulated government and public discussion.  
Numerous buzz words, such as “Green Homes,” “Environmentally Conscious,” or “Energy 
Efficient,” have headlined newspapers, magazines articles, and other published literature. 
These buzz words and conversations continue to be vague because there are many 
unknowns (See Table 1).  
The market for energy efficient homes and features has grown but it has affected 
new homes more than the existing housing stock. The task of this study is to see if 
consumers recognize and price certain energy features of new homes as analyzed by a log-
linear regression model. I will also make the connections between the real estate market, 
energy usage, public policy, and home improvement sectors to determine how they value 
energy efficiency features. To date there have been few studies that look at issues having 
these elements.                                       
Purpose of Thesis Research 
The purpose of this research is to quantify the relationship between energy efficiency 
features and market value of a residential home in Austin, Texas. The following four issues 
are what I conclude compromise the subject.  
 
1. Volatility in energy prices  
2. Lack of information and education on: 
a. Valuation and understanding of energy features in home 
pricing 
b. Risk, cost, and benefits of energy features in real estate 
c. Best practices in investment underwriting and construction 
3. Growing market for energy efficient features in homes  
4. Need for information for decision making and legislation  
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The significance of this study will lead to a better understanding of how a real estate 
market prices homes with energy efficient features versus homes that do not contain those 
features in one market. The hypothesis that energy efficient features save money I would 
expect to be capitalized in the price of the home.  Underwriting for financial incentives of 
energy efficient homes can be adapted to the investments homeowners put into their homes. 
On a bigger scale one can see if energy efficient features are valuable and effective for homes 
so that they might reduce strain on natural ecosystems to produce resources. 
Historical Background 
The era of 1850-1950 saw systematic changes in the environment due to 
industrialization and urbanization across the US. Furthermore, from 1950 to the present 
(2007) transformations of natural environments progressed rapidly under pressures of 
rapidly rising energy consumption (See Figure 2).  
In the early settlements (pre-1850), clearing and stripping of land was primarily done 
for agriculture and timber harvesting. In addition, early manufacturing used water power for 
energy which was perceived as more of a local or regional issue with complaints from locals 
about noise or smell. The industrial years brought three major pressures to the environment: 
steady rising levels of population, consumption, and industrial production (Hays 10).  The 
growing population continued to expand into new territories to farm or produce industrial 
products, and it abandoned an area once resources were exhausted. Consumption went from 
inelastic goods to “convenience goods” which required more energy and factories to 
produce. This shift in consumption could arguably be the root cause of the environmental 
pressures, especially energy, the US faces in 2007.  
From 1938-1956 the US population rose dramatically and consumer spending grew 
with higher incomes after World War II (Hays 16).  Young people in the population needed 
new housing and could afford more commodities such as cars and appliances. To respond to 
these needs housing, transportation, and energy were all added to. Increased construction of 
residences, commercial buildings, factories, and shopping malls were a US phenomenon of 
post World War II.  Cities lost growth to the residential areas that grew up around them and 
drew the commercial centers towards these suburbs.  Transportation networks for 
automobiles, airplanes, and trucks sprang up over the nation in and between cities to carry 
goods and humans. According to Sammuel Hays this development was and is essentially an 
energy issue. His stance was the following:  
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Almost every development issue was, in one way or another, 
an energy issue, since development required energy, gave rise  
to new modes of transportation that required energy, produced 
pollution that required energy to mitigate, and generated  
consumption that required energy both to produce what was  
consumed and to facilitate consumption itself. –Hays 12 
 
Therefore, energy efficient residential development will become a pressing issue due to the 
underlying distribution of energy consumption in the US.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The subsequent sections will be on energy usage and policy, real estate modeling, and 
the home improvement sectors. I first begin with the US Energy Information Agency’s 
(EIA) “Annual Energy Review 2005” which offers a glimpse at why one should be 
concerned about energy consumption and specifically in the residential sector. I use time 
series graphs of different energy sources and rates in the US to summarize 50+ years of data. 
I then move to historical events that transformed energy policy in the residential sector in 
the US. Finally, I conclude what effect these historical events and policy decisions have had 
on residential real estate in terms of energy efficiency. 
Energy Policy 
The EIA’s 2005 Annual Energy Review has reliable data and statistics on energy 
consumption in the US over time. For example, the EIA states the US was “self-sufficient in 
energy [pre-1949]—producing and consuming 32 quadrillion British thermal units (BTU), 
[and] importing less than 1.5 quadrillion BTUs…By the early 1960s indigenous supplies were 
no longer sufficient to meet demand” (EIA 2005). This phenomenon is attributed to many 
factors, but the US’s thirst for energy is apparent with an average 2.5%/yr growth in the 
residential sector since 1949. The residential sector consumes approximately 22% of all end-
use energy relative to commercial, industrial, and transportation (Figure 3). Figure 3 
demonstrates an extrapolated positive linear trend in the residential sector in the future. Such 
a trend is what energy efficiency is trying to mitigate. Notable statistics in EIA’s report are: in 
2001, 65% of US households had a ceiling fan, 55% had central air conditioning, and 83% 
had one refrigerator. (EIA 2005).   
To support these claims I look at the trends and rates of energy consumption in the 
residential sector. Figure 3 shows us that residential, commercial, industrial, and transport 
sectors all positively increased in energy consumption from 1949-2005; with residential 
averaging 2.5% per year. Figure 4 illustrates the aggregate energy consumption by sector with 
residential ranking third in the four sectors. Figure 5 represents a phenomenon where energy 
loss became greater than the supply of energy sources starting circa 1976. Lastly, Figure 6 
shows renewable energy to be a very low contributor for producing energy for the residential 
sector. One graph that is helpful in understanding regional consumption in the US can be 
seen in Figure 6.   
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Another concern over energy prices is the severance tax, a tax on extracting natural 
resources such as oil, coal, or gas, imposed by states (See Figure 4, Appendix A). In an article 
of the April 2006 State Legislature magazine stated a “handful of major energy-producing 
states are reporting a significant rise in 2005 severance tax collection related to recent up tick 
in energy prices” (“State Energy Revenues Gushing” 7). This means if it costs more for 
producers to make energy then energy will be that much less affordable. In broad terms, 
Figures 1-8 depict the US’s finite amount of resources which it can draw from to consume 
energy.  Those natural resources must be able to sustain themselves if US single family 
household residents’ current standard is not to fall.   
With an overview on energy consumption I move to what caused energy efficiency 
to become important.  Most US energy concerns were brought forth during the 1970s with 
the two energy and oil crises. In 1973 the Arab Oil Embargo created by the Yom Kippur 
War in the Middle East was the first time that the US and other foreign countries realized 
the degree of their dependence on crude oil for the production of energy and industrialized 
needs. A second oil crisis occurred in the 1979 in the midst of the Iranian revolution that 
considerably affected the US again. When the new Iranian regime seized power, it also took 
custody of Iran’s oil exports, and they exported at capricious and low volume levels that 
spread US and world panic because of inconsistency in price and supply expectations. We 
can see the risk profile of oil in the 1970s through its price spike seen in Figure 1. As a result 
of the 1973 oil crisis the Department of Energy was created in 1977 to oversee energy and 
nuclear policy (Jones 10).   
On July 15, 1979 President Jimmy Carter publicly addressed the topic of energy in 
his “Crisis of Confidence” speech (Carter 1979). In Carter’s address to the nation, three of 
his six points speak to the purpose of this study. Point three, addressed energy security and 
independence by developing alternative sources of fuel for the US.  Point three conceived 
and shaped alternative sources of fuel, everything from solar power to ethanol gasoline, in 
order to decrease dependency on foreign oil. Point four asked “Congress to mandate, to 
require as a matter of law, that our nation’s utility companies cut their massive use of oil by 
50% within the next decade and switch to other fuels, especially coal, our most abundant 
energy source” (Carter 1979). Point six proposed an affordable conservation program for 
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residential homes1. Point six is crucial in respects to the federal government taking a stand 
on energy efficiency in buildings and creating public education to encourage energy 
conservation. In his sixth point, Carter asked Americans to “set your thermostats to save 
fuel” (Carter 1979). All three of these points Carter addressed were implemented in the 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, but only point four was enforced over the 
long term. As part of The National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978 utilities were 
required to make available energy conservation audits and other services to slow the demand 
of electricity. These audits would later be helpful in gathering data for studies like that of 
Metcalf and Hassett, to be discussed later. 
Presently, many states have and are considering passing legislation and allocating 
money to “green” practices like energy efficiency.  For example, in the State of 
Massachusetts governor Deval Patrick issued an executive order “setting higher standards on 
energy efficiency and mandating greater use of renewable energy throughout state 
government” (Patrick 2007). The executive order required state agencies to reduce overall 
energy consumption by 20 percent by 2012 from 2002 levels and 35% by 2020. To 
implement these goals state agencies would be required to:  
1. Obtain 15 percent of their electricity from clean renewable sources by 2012, 30 
percent by 2020 
2. Use biofuels for 3 percent of heating oil next winter, 5 percent in 2008-09 
3. Meet Massachusetts’s LEED-Plus green building standards for all new construction 
and major renovations, and consider energy performance in leasing decisions 
4. Reduce potable water use 10 percent over the next five years, 15 percent by 2020. 
The executive order requires state facilities over 100,000 square feet to be retrofitted 
for energy efficiency by 2012 and requires the purchase of energy efficient products such as 
“programmable thermostats.” 
In San Diego, California, the city announced an initiative to achieve 50-megawatts of 
energy efficiency in the next ten years (Atkins & Turk 2006). Toni Atkins stated that the 
city’s “Commitment to fulfill 10 percent of that goal by performing efficiency upgrades in 
city-owned facilities. In the past year, the city upgraded 84 structures and reduced electrical 
needs by more than 2.3 million kilowatt-hours a year” (Atkins & Turk 2006). The Rebuild a 
Greener San Diego program, started in 2003, evolved from its original mission to help 
                                                 
1 Residential homes are defined to be detached single family households not including apartments, houseboats, 
or trailers 
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residents rebuild their home after the 2003 San Diego fires. The program progressed into the 
County of San Diego Green Building Incentive Program.  It has become a successful 
program in which the city, county, and regional government offices, as well as the local 
electrical utility, support.  The program offers three incentives for eligible homes that 
incorporate energy efficient standards in residential and commercial buildings. The program 
is proving worthwhile by offering the following incentives:  
 
1. Reduced plan review turn around time by city officials (saves 7-10 days on project 
timeline) 
2. A 7.5% reduction in plan review and building permit fees 
3. No fees for the building permit and plan review for residential photovoltaic systems 
 
By cutting entitlement times and permit fees for builders, developers, and residential 
owners this program has become extremely attractive. The first qualifications of the program 
were that your home was affected by the fire.  It offered the three incentives to build with 
energy efficiency as part of San Diego’s Energy Conservation and Management’s mission 
created in 2001  The application requires that one or more of the energy efficiency standards 
be applied to receive the incentives.  With many attractive incentives the program has 
become competitive for funding and many people put in more energy features than is 
required.  
 The states of Hawaii and New Hampshire have created a Pay-as-You-Save pilot 
project that allows building owners and tenants to purchase and install energy efficient 
features with no-upfront payment or debt commitment (Cilo 2005). The costs of the energy 
efficient products are added to the utility bill while one occupies the unit. This program is 
being studied to see if it is effective and if it should replicated elsewhere. 
 A recent study by Neal Elliot et al “Potential for Energy Efficiency, Demand 
Response, and Onsite Renewable Energy to Meet Texas’s growing Electricity Needs” (2007) 
stated that Texas’s energy challenges could be met through energy efficiency.  The study 
found that “the most pressing short-term policy issue in Texas is rapid growth in peak 
[electric] demand” (Elliot et al 2007). The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) 
reported that peak demand on the electric system increased 2.5%/yr between 1990 and 2006 
and forecasts for peak-demand would increase 2.3%/yr from 2007-2012 (Elliot et al 2007).  
ECROT has raised issues that Texas may have insufficient capacity to meet peak demand if 
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the current trend continues to 2009. The study recommends nine policies that would 
mitigate peak demand energy through energy efficiency in Texas. Those policies are:  
1. Expanded Utility-Sector Energy Efficiency Improvement Program 
2. New State-Level Appliance and Equipment Standards 
3. More Stringent Building Energy Codes 
4. Advanced Energy-Efficient Building Program 
5. Energy-Efficient State and Municipal Buildings Program 
6. Short-Term Public Education and Rate Incentives 
7. Increased Demand Response Programs 
8. Combined Heat and Power (CHP) Capacity Target 
9. Onsite Renewable Energy Incentives 
These policies are very similar to what other states like Massachusetts and California 
have done to address energy issues and save money.  Texas has programs like that of the 
Austin Green Building Program in place, and these polices try to get energy efficiency 
standardization across the state while stabilizing electricity supply. The policies are steering 
Texas to sustainable practices on energy while potentially saving money at the state and 
individual level.  
In Judith Crosson’s article “Gung Ho for Green” argues that consistency and 
predictability of government rules and regulations are what business people desire to convert 
to green homes and add energy efficient features.  For example, she states “Developers need 
to know the true costs of a new technology. Bankers deciding on a loan application need to 
know if a tax credit will be around for the term of the loan. Manufacturers who plan to 
increase capacity for a cutting-edge technology want to know how long a tax credit will run” 
(16). Polices come in and fade out with changing administrations and that leave industry to 
take on the full risks of going green or incorporating energy efficient features. The 
uncertainty of the government leads businesses as well as the real estate market, which is 
risk-averse, to take the full risk when the cash flows from the government are cut off 
because those funds need to be allocated somewhere else. Ellen Anderson, a senator of the 
state of Minnesota, says that this is one the reasons “Fossil fuels and nuclear [energy] have 
been the winners for decades” (Crosson 16). Stable policies over the life of real estate 
investments, which are typically long term, are what are desired.  
In February of 2007, Austin’s mayor Will Lynn approved the Austin Climate 
Protection Plan. The plan included progressive legislation that strives to curb global 
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warming. Within the plan, energy efficiency in Austin homes is addressed. The plan calls for 
700 megawatts of electricity savings through energy efficiency by 2012. The City of Austin 
will do this through energy efficient building codes for new construction. Moreover, the plan 
takes existing homes and buildings into account and will require them to “meet basic energy 
efficiency requirements upon resale.” Mayor Lynn mentions insulation, weather stripping, 
and solar screens as “low-cost high-return investments…that outweigh the costs of the 
improvements.” This is a progressive stance, but its impact on energy efficiency would be 
large since most of the housing stock is existing.   
Energy Usage 
Steven Nadel suggests that standards for household appliance, lighting, and 
equipment are part of the solution. He also states that Carter Administration’s mandatory 
state standards which ultimately ended up in the National Energy Conservation and Policy 
Act of 1978 paved the way for the US Department of Energy to develop minimum 
standards on appliances (Nadel 2002). These standards were reversed in federal court in 
1985 under the Regan administration’s favoring open market policies, but were resurrected 
under the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 which was signed by 
President Reagan. Nadel concludes that equipment efficiency standards are an effective 
energy-savings policy (Nadel 2002). With other countries in the lead on efficiency standards, 
e.g. European Union, the US can look at examples of what increasing the standards for 
appliances mean.  
To assess progress in energy efficiency behavior a study conducted in Sweden 
examined how the information that was available in the 1980s differed from that in 2005. 
The 2005 study looked specifically at residential energy behavior and the policy instruments 
of a city. The examination of 600 Swedish households showed that in order to promote 
energy efficiency at the individual level, economic measures such as taxes and pricing need to 
be used (Linden 2005). The study concluded that when consumers are confronted with 
energy efficient (and inefficient) behaviors that consumers request information, and pay 
special attention to user friendly technology & economic programs for lowering their energy 
use.  In essence from a policy perspective, the decision maker requires information that is 
noteworthy in order to voluntarily consider a change while receiving some form of individual 
economic benefit to supplement the information. 
 - 14 -
While the economic benefit acts as an incentive to consider switching to energy 
efficient behavior, the actual physical improvement has the effect of changing individual 
habits because it acts as a repeating reminder (Linden 2001).  Information is one of the key 
reasons the Department of Energy and the Energy Star Program were created. Residential 
mortgage lenders did not know how to price energy efficiency in the 1980s, and home 
improvement manufacturers thought there was no way of measuring energy efficiency.  For 
example, in 1985 a study commissioned by Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation studied 
150 mortgage lenders nationwide and found that “one in ten lenders offered preferential 
loan treatment to buyers of energy efficient homes” (Savings Institution 122). Yet, Robert 
Patnaude of Ownes-Corning suggested that this difference in lender’s attitudes on energy 
efficiency and practice is due to no “accurate method for measuring energy efficiency” (US 
League of Savings Institutions 122).  The study, which may be still true today, showed that 
“43% of lenders surveyed used visual appraisals as their method of determining energy 
efficiency.” We now have data to support or fail to support energy efficient claims in the 
residential market with energy audits.  
Home Improvement Business 
Energy efficiency in the real estate sector to date has not been well researched. 
Bradshaw’s “Buying Green” (2005) and Metcalf & Hassett’s “Measuring the Energy Savings 
from Home Improvement Investments: Evidence from Monthly Billing Data” (1999) are the 
few studies to date that address how real estate, energy usage, and the home building sectors 
interact on a single home. Golove and Eto (1996) recommended “continued inquiry” on 
market barriers to energy efficiency in their report funded by the Assistant Secretary of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy- US Department of Energy.  
In real estate, advocates of energy efficient features think that the real estate market 
undervalues energy efficient features in homes. Kempton and Montgomery (1982) looked at 
how consumers calculate energy savings from energy efficient investments, and they 
concluded that predominant ex-ante 1982 methods systematically underestimated energy 
savings. This they attributed to lack of information.   This has most likely changed since 
1992 when the federal government created the ENERGY STAR program. 
There is now more information about energy efficient features for homes from 
sources like Energy Star and the US Department of Energy, but that information has not 
been analyzed usefully for pricing homes. In William Prindle’s “Quantifying the Effects of 
 - 15 -
Market Failures in the End-Use of Energy” (2007) study he argues that price information for 
energy efficient investments are not adequate and that market barriers, such as the 
“principle-agent” barrier, obstruct energy efficient investments.  Prindle looks at five 
countries and studied average energy use, devices affected by barrier, and energy use affected 
by barrier. The principle-agent barrier was defined as a situation in which one party, the 
agent (i.e. residential developer), makes decisions affecting end-use energy efficiency in a 
given market, and a different party, the principal (i.e. facility manager or home owner), bears 
the consequence of those decisions. For example, decisions for new residential homes are 
made by the developer; his decisions ultimately affect the energy use and expenditures of 
homebuyers (Prindle, iii). Prindle’s study found that in the USA the principal-agent problem 
affected energy end-use 25.2% of the time in residential refrigeration, 77% in residential 
water heating, 47.5% in residential space heating, and 2.3% of the time in residential lighting. 
Prindle concluded that “Market failures are significant and widespread…in many kinds of 
economies” (Prindle vii).  These numbers imply that the consumer ends up stuck with a 
system in their home that is more costly than energy efficient systems would be.   
If information is available about cost savings, shouldn’t developers be encouraged to 
use energy efficient features? The answer may be in the following quote in a New York Times 
article about Toll Brothers: 
 
The company [Toll Brothers] had already learned that buyers 
will choose visible flourishes over pragmatism every time. 
During the energy crisis of the late 1970's, for instance, one 
option was a higher grade of insulation. ‘No one bought it,’ 
Barzilay, Toll's president, says. "Everyone spent their extra 
money on moldings."- Gertner, Oct 2005 
 
Maybe energy efficiency is not important to consumers, even though they will pay 
costs incurred in higher energy bills later for extended periods of time. The Toll Brothers’ 
statement is in defense of the agency problem, and the company is simply responding to 
market demand. Another issue maybe that some energy features are used in the home so 
infrequently that developers or consumers will not bother with these installations since 
homebuyers will rarely them. Also, the maintenance costs and effort associated with energy 
 - 16 -
features maybe too great for consumers or developers. Inspections of homes by the city or 
consumer may deem energy features out-of-date or not-to-code after new technologies are 
on the market. If consumers, won’t buy the features then developers have no incentive to 
put those upfront costs into the house.  
Gilbert Metcalf and Kevin Hassett (1999) may have one of the few rigorous studies 
that look at energy savings from the perspective of home improvement. They used the 
Department of Energy’s Residential Energy Conservation Survey (RECS) survey which was 
unique because it combined the Household Survey and the Energy Supplier Survey data. The 
Household Survey contains structural, neighborhood, and location information. The Energy 
Supplier Survey has billing statements of the actual energy usage for each of the households 
in the Household Survey. These two datasets connect energy efficiency to households while 
at the same time “eliminating noise” and narrowing down assumptions made about the 
household (Metcalf & Hassett 1999).Their study on energy efficiency home improvement 
looks at the following energy features from the RECS:  
 
1. attic insulation 
2. thermostat setting 
3. central or room air conditioning  
4. area heated (ft2) 
5. furnace age 
6. number of windows 
 
Metcalf and Hassett find that “mean income, education levels, and age of the main 
householder all show no statistically significant difference between investors and non-
investors [of energy improvements]” (Metcalf and Hassett 1999). Although, the authors 
expected such an outcome since these variables are independent of return on investment.  
The results do suggest that these variables shouldn’t affect the decision to add energy 
efficient features. The main conclusion that Metcalf and Hassett drew from their empirical 
study was that rates of return for energy investments are substantially lower than former 
engineers’ or manufacturer’s estimates. This means that consumers are most likely pricing 
energy savings for home improvements correctly and that a change to energy efficient 
features may not be worth it to homeowners in this study.  The “energy paradox, the 
perception that consumers apply unreasonably high hurdle rates to energy-savings 
investments”, was confirmed not to be true (Metcalf and Hassett 1999).  For example, the 
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average rate of return on attic insulation was 11% which was statistically significant; 
however, the median (a more robust figure) was 9.7%. Metcalf and Hassett report that these 
two figures “put an upper bound on the implied discount rate for the energy investments 
…and are consistent with plausible discount rates suggested by a CAPM [Capital Asset 
Pricing Model] analysis” (Metcalf and Hassett 1999).  These may sound like decent returns 
on investment but the consumer may attribute more risk, time, and effort to the rates above 
what they maybe financially saving on energy features. Consumers may need, say a 20%, 
present value savings in order to take on the investment. They would have to consider the 
cost of the investment versus the change in energy consumption. One drawback on Metcalf 
and Hassett’s data is that houses tend to be a bit older, 50% built before 1950, for their 1984, 
1987, and 1990 surveys. On the up-side, their auxiliary test for attic insulation is a two-stage 
(log linear) least squares regression. The overarching story in the Metcalf and Hassett study is 
that consumers do not bear the societal costs on the environment for using more energy. 
Claims of Green Housing 
A “green home” in this thesis will be taken to mean a home that has been rated as 
green by the single-family residential rating program run by the Austin Green Building 
Program (GBP). A conventional home is one that has not been rated by GPB. The author 
recognizes the incomplete nature of the assumptions underlying this delineation of green 
and conventional. It is likely that some homes that have not been rated have adopted green 
principles in some measure, and vice versa. In effect, this definition has “noise,” yet acts as a 
baseline (Bradshaw 2005).  
The marketing efforts of advocates of green housing have good intentions but are 
potentially misleading. Across many studies on green development2 the following claims that 
green buildings are better private investments are apparent as seen in the below: 
• Green homes cost the same or slightly more to build 
• Green homes cost less to operate 
• Green homes sell/rent higher than conventional homes 
(Bradshaw 2005, Rocky Mountain Institute 1998, 
Urban Environmental Institute 2002, Yates 2001) 
 
                                                 
2 Green development is defined as real estate development with explicit ecological and/or environmental goals. 
In effect, green development attempts to care for the environment (cultural and natural) in which buildings are 
placed (Bradshaw 2005).  
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However, most green building studies look and describe highly successful 
developments of the “Could be” with no respect to the working real estate market of 
“What’s expected.” This means that advocates mislead in extrapolating a few successful 
cases of energy efficiency or green homes to be a general model for how housing should be 
constructed in order to maximize public benefit to society. Advocates of green development 
tend not to address the expectations and variables that the established real estate market 
examine. Advocates are absent in the financial evaluation of green building. Three premises 
of the real estate market that are often overlooked by advocates are:  
 
1. Real estate markets are stratified by location (space) and product type (asset) 
2. Real estate investments are based on expectations about a future state of the market 
based on average performance above the risk-free rate of return 
3. Real estate development is intricately linked to the capital market 
 
Fundamentally, real estate development is a risk-return industry which has 
established variables which are used in decision making. The private sector seeks value 
because it is required to keep the company maintained, allows for funding of new ventures 
(such as green building and energy efficiency), and it must satisfy its shareholders.  
Conversely, green building advocates tend to be concerned with other objectives such as 
open space, meeting public needs, and societal benefit. These variables do not speak to the 
language of the real estate market and may not directly affect private returns, but are 
important in a different realm.  If the three premises above are true, the conclusion of the 
hypothesis of this study could be generalized to other real estate markets with similar 
characteristics. 
Both parties’ objectives have public and private value if the financial estimation can 
be verified. A sub-purpose of this study is to use variables that the real estate sector uses, 
such as monetary savings, to make a rigorous statement about green housing. The author 
suggests that the current instruments/variables used to make statements about green 
housing from the advocate’s point of view have been insufficient in measuring the issue to 
apply to the working real estate market. Conversely, traditional real estate methodology has 
not had the tools to evaluate green housing  
Marketing of Green Homes & Energy Efficient Features 
The marketing efforts of energy efficiency and green housing are primarily 
concerned about promotion of green housing and energy efficient features. The promotion 
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is backed by case studies of highly successful projects that had energy efficient features or 
were green rated.  There have been strides taken by diverse industries to market green 
building and energy efficiency. Most marketing focuses on global trends such as the theory 
of global warming, release of carbon into the atmosphere, or climate change; however, many 
times these issues fail to relate down to the scale of a house and its consumption of 
resources and energy. A large amount of press and marketing of green buildings and energy 
efficiency has been surfacing lately in local, national, and world news.   
In the Judith Crosson’s article “Gung Ho for Green” in State Legislatures magazine, 
Minnesota Senator Ellen Anderson, states “I think high energy costs have really hit home. 
People have a general understanding that the reason we have these high energy costs is that 
we are at the whim of unstable regimes, hurricanes and other factors, some out of our 
control. It makes people believe very strongly in the idea of energy independence” (2006). A 
statement like this blankets what energy efficiency and green homes are trying to achieve, 
saving money while being environmentally conscious. Anderson’s statement does not 
address the variables the real estate market measures. Vanity Fair, a culture and fashion 
magazine, had a special “green issue” that talked about how “green is the new black” with 
support from activists, such as Al Gore and George Clooney, who are well known to the 
American public. In Realtor Magazine, a 2003 article titled “Selling Green” Pattie Glenn, a 
RE/MAX broker in Gainesville, FL, uses the following models to understand what green 
features appeal to different consumers:  
• Thinkers want things quantified. A home’s energy efficiency rating is a big selling 
point with these buyers.  
• Drivers want to be recognized as the best. They want others to know what a great 
home they have, so they are a good source of customer referrals.  
• Amiables relate to the comfort, health, and safety benefits of a green home.  
• Expressives will want to use their added purchasing power to buy frills such as nicer 
kitchen cabinets. (Stahl 2003) 
Glenn like many others must translate technical data to various consumers with 
different tastes. Price is the best and most standard way to translate all technical aspects that 
reflect all available and relevant information in a particular market (efficient market 
model3).More recently and financially speaking, Hines, a large international real estate firm, 
announced on September 27, 2006 that it created the first US “green” fund ($120 million of 
                                                 
3 Established by Eugene Fama in his article Efficient Capital Markets in the Journal of Finance, 1970.  
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contractual equity) with CalPERS, the US’s largest pension fund, which would target solely 
sustainable development. This move sets a precedent for the real estate development 
industry as whole, but does not assess the risk associated with making this financial 
commitment for other developers to follow. 
Green marketing offers publicity (good or bad) which exposes and informs persons 
about these issues, yet it can be heavily biased. Two common fallacies of green marketing are 
that cost equals value4 and that the private sector’s stance is unknown. From a value 
engineering perspective a green home’s value can be increased by increasing its “function” 
(See equation in footnote) or reducing cost, and quality should not be reduced at the 
consequence of value. Secondly, the author believes that the private sector’s stance is quite 
clear; if there is de facto value to be pursued for shareholder/stakeholders the private sector 
will undertake the investment with manageable risk.  
Green building could be similar to a story of the “Plastic House” built at MIT and 
exhibited at Disneyland on June 1957. The plastic house was conceptualized and designed by 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Marvin Goody.  The plastic house was an 
experimental design which showed how living 30 years from 1957 (i.e. 1987) might look and 
be like. Plastic was still relatively new then and “excited the public imagination” (Kissell 
2005). The “house of the future” was located in Disney’s Tomorrowland and lasted until 
1967 with 20 million visitors having visited the plastic house. Robert Whittier, the plastic 
house’s project manager, remembers “everyone loved it, and everybody wanted one,” and 
his desk would be flooded with mail from the plastic houses’ admirers. Even with the 
overwhelmingly number of responses, he said it “wasn’t enough to create a viable 
market…this was a pretty radical proposal for a very conservative housing market.” The 
plastic house brings many questions to mind that green housing does. One is, who and why 
would anyone live in a green home or a plastic home? Another important factor is that 
Whittier mentions the market as the driving force which would carry the project on, which 
green building is trying to achieve. The why for green housing is that it potentially saves 
money, but the who is a much harder question to answer.  
                                                 
4 
Cost
Function
Cost
CapabilityePerformancValue =+= )(     where value is measured from the customer’s perspective  
http://www.npd-solutions.com/va.html  Accessed December 12, 2006.  
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The intersections of energy, the environment, and housing are possibly approaching 
a tipping point5 within the US and beyond. The marketing of these issues with affluent and 
“glamorous” activists send a message to the general population that it is an issue to be 
concerned about and that green housing may become main stream. However, the evidence 
to support the claims that energy efficient features or green homes save significant money is 
somewhat of a wash and could be a concept that fascinates the market like that of the plastic 
home. For this reason and until further research is conducted, one must ask if green housing 
is a fashion? 
Real Estate Economics for Green Homes 
Green homes have become a real consumer option in the real estate market because 
of the possibility that they are better and higher use than conventionally built houses. 
Moreover, depending on how the US economy changes with respect to short/long term 
interest rates, tax code, construction costs, and zoning regulation the supply and demand of 
green homes may be in the price range to more consumers (DiPasquale-Wheaton 1996). 
Following consumer theory’s income effect, the relative elasticity of commuting costs and 
land demand will be factors in paying a premium for a green home. The substitution effect 
of a conventional home for a green home is one the biggest barriers for the green home 
market.  The assumption is that a person’s tendency is to substitute a green home that is 
comparatively more expensive than a conventional home not because of quality but because 
of cost with the expectation of future savings. One of the qualities that a green home offers 
that will be forgone is energy costs. Consumers would not know this otherwise or would 
know it, but forgo it due to the cost burden at that particular time.  One of the difficulties of 
energy efficiency is how to show it as mentioned previously.  Presently, in 2007, energy 
efficiency indicators are limited by the availability and cost of data. Collection, organizing, 
and analyzing energy efficiency data, in addition to the equipment recording data, is 
expensive.  
An efficient market model6 would expect that at any given time, prices fully reflect all 
available and relevant information in a particular market (e.g. real estate); thus, no investor 
                                                 
5 A term coined by Morton Grodzins that refers to the dramatic point when something unique becomes 
common.  
   Source: www.urbandictionary.com Accessed November 3, 2006. 
6 Established by Eugene Fama in his article Efficient Capital Markets in the Journal of Finance, 1970.  
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has an advantage in predicting a return on an asset. The three forms of efficiency commonly 
accepted are: 
1. Strong Form Efficiency- No investor can earn excess returns [in the long term] 
using any information, whether publicly available or not (Copeland et al,355).   
2. Semi-Strong Form Efficiency-No investor can earn excess returns from trading 
rules based on any publicly available information [potential future events] (Copeland 
et al 355). 
3. Weak Form Efficiency-No investor can earn excess returns by developing trading 
rules based on historical prices, returns, or trading history of an asset (Copeland et al 
355). 
 
Gutermann and Smith in their study of weak form efficiency in the residential real 
estate markets across different geographic locations test results showed market inefficiency. 
However, since their study did not include transaction costs and the maximum expected 
appreciation was less than two percent they attributed this profit would be captured by 
transaction costs. Hence, they concluded that real estate markets were weak form efficient 
once transactions cost are included. One vulnerability the study cites is that the study was 
“focused on differences across multiple markets for similar properties,” which could 
diversify out risks and leaves the question of trading strategies of different property types in 
different locations within a metro market (42).  They also state “There may also be more 
complex trading strategies which could yield positive abnormal returns” (42).  This study 
alludes to the fact that inefficiency may be occurring, but is unknown due to variables 
outside the model.  
On the contrary, Keogh and D’Arcy argue that it is inappropriate to “assess 
efficiency with respect to idealized concepts based on either Pareto optimality or full 
information” for the property market (2411).  They believe most studies fail to make a 
connection between informational efficiency and the issues of operational and allocative 
efficiency. This stems from their assumption that Fama’s model is extensively used in real 
estate markets when it was intended for financial securities markets. Keogh and D’Arcy 
argue that standard textbook (Fraser, 1993; Harvey, 1996) and research papers on the subject 
(Jaffe & Sirmans, 1984; Gau, 1987; Gutermann & Smith, 1987; Evans, 1995) suggest the 
property market is “subject to imperfections, implying allocative inefficiency” (2402). This 
discernment emanates from their belief of legal and physical characteristics of property, 
which is exemplified in Gutermann & Smith. This begs the question if there is an arbitrage 
opportunity. For example, if the transaction cost of a real estate agent’s fee and commission 
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can be reduced or eliminated suggests one can systematically beat the market as long as this 
common practice is in place, consequently the presence of an inefficient market. But finance 
theory states a project will be undertaken until the rate of return on even the most least 
profitable project is just over opportunity cost of capital. This criterion yields an 
allocationally efficient market for the reason that prices are determined in a way that equates 
the marginal rates of return, adjusted for risk, for all producers and savers (Copeland 353).  
Nature 
Aside, from the range of prices buyers are willing to pay there are separate 
unaccounted reasons why a buyer would want a green home that are qualitative in character. 
Two of these aspects that the author feels are important are a biological connection to 
nature and layout of place.  
Across many cultures, nature is one of the few aspects that humans can relate to as a 
lowest common denominator. An easy conversation starter between humans has always 
been to talk about the weather. For example, the following common sayings use similes and 
metaphors to compare nature to something else which can easily be understood by others; 
“It’s colder/hotter than a …,” or  “It’s raining cats and dogs out there,” or “It’s as cold as 
ice.” Acclaimed biologist Edward O. Wilson’s Biophilia hypothesis suggests humans have a 
deep preference to natural environments which stem from humans long evolutionary 
biological process. The hypothesis asks why normal people tend to go to parks, be with or 
look at animals, or have plants around the home. Wilson believes that human’s love for life 
[nature] sustains life. This biological connection is important because humans can distinctly 
determine the difference between a natural and artificial product (Salingar 1). This innate 
attribute could behaviorally affect the outcome of purchasing or paying a premium for a 
green home. In The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature Steven Pinker, 
expert on cognitive neuroscience, believes that “Human tastes are reversible cultural 
preferences [that] ha[ve] led social planners to write off people’s enjoyment of ornament, 
natural light, and human scale and force millions of people to live in drab cement boxes” (x-
xi). Pinker goes on to show real life examples of cities that were “failures” in not recognizing 
inborn desires such as nature exemplified in modernists cities like Chandigrah and Brasilia 
that incorporated “scientific principles” over common sense.  The author of this paper 
believes, through observation, that through these two theories people are concerned about 
the aesthetics of a green home because it may not feel natural to people. A thought that 
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something is drastically different from what used to be there, e.g. a greenfield that is now a 
brownfield with a house on it, brings thoughts that are uncomfortable which may deter a 
purchase or premium paid for a green home. The human touch of a home versus a house 
perceived as a machine through its controls, layout, and design could deter purchases or 
lower value of a green home that may be energy efficient. On the other hand, McHarg, 
Alexander, and Barry Barton believe that greening of a home is a movement away from 
highly technical forms of building and ventilation, and a rebirth to more localized colloquial 
methods. Buildings as gardens rather buildings as a machine are the themes which McHarg 
and Alexander get at. These two biological theories by Wilson and Pinker are examples of 
aspects that could affect the purchase or price premium of a green home not encompassed 
by the model assessing savings later in the paper.  
Relating this human-nature phenomenon to urban planning for green homes, Kevin 
Lynch’s studies looked exclusively at how easy it was for humans to understand the layout of 
a place. Of the elements Lynch defined (paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks) many 
natural features such as rivers (an edge), mountains (landmark), or trees (path) define cities 
and make them attractive to people.  Lynch’s studies of determining place found that 
interviewees when asked to navigate tended to veer off their destination to go through a 
vivid part of the city, and most people mentioning water and vegetation with pleasure in 
their response. It could be possible that a conglomeration of green homes could be attractive 
to consumers which would be easily identifiable as a landmark, district, or node within a 
metropolitan area. The new urbanism movement suggests that this element could be true for 
the single family residential market citing examples like Celebration, Florida and Legacy 
Town Center in Plano, Texas. Critics of new urbanism tend to allude that aesthetics are 
sensationalized over practicality, which would support the inclination that persons care 
about nature through aesthetics.  
The biological connection and layout of place could be other variables not measured 
in the model which could explain the variation of price premiums willing to be paid upfront 
rather than later if the hypothesis was found to be null.  
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Hypothesis 
In order for one to make a claim with confidence about energy features in residential 
homes one must have a hypothesis to empirically test. The following hypothesis will be 
tested: 
 
H1: Energy features in Austin residential homes provide future cost savings that are 
      capitalized into house price.  
 
The regression models will suggest if energy features influence house prices 
negatively or positively. Once we know the outcome of the hypothesis we can speculate on 
the notion that the market perceives energy features to save money and/or add value to a 
home.  If there is a price premium for energy features we can assume there is future cost 
savings or that consumers price energy features. If energy features are not significant the 
following three reasons are the most likely candidates. One is that the model is not a good 
predictor of price. Second, the price effects of energy features are too small. Or thirdly, 
homebuyers do not capitalize energy features when buying a home.  
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DATA SETS 
 
The data for this study used were collected by William Bradshaw, in his 2005 dual 
degree thesis, from four primary sources in Austin. Those sources come from the Austin 
Board of Realtors7 (ABoR), Austin Green Building Program8 (GBP), Williamson County 
Appraisal District (WCAD), and the Travis County Appraisal District Data9 (TCAD).  
Structure, neighborhood, and transaction information along with energy efficient features 
were contained in the ABoR dataset.  The GBP supplied green rating information while the 
WCAD and TCAD dataset provided lot size and square footage information. 
From the start, there were inconsistencies with the recording of certain fields in the 
ABoR dataset.  For example, some homes would have a large amount of beds, but would be 
less than 400 square feet. The ABoR dataset had a large amount of homes priced below 
$55,000 which seemed highly unlikely in today’s market. These inconsistencies would make 
interpretation and reliability an issue. Hence, the ABoR dataset was put through a series of 
logic rules (See Table 2). Once the ABoR dataset was downsized, the issue of how to 
interpret a zero versus a blank cell in the energy variable columns was questioned. This could 
be interpreted in two ways. A blank was truly a zero and had no energy features in the home 
or that there was an energy feature in the home, but it was not recorded in the file.  In order 
to ensure interpretable and reliable results a series of robustness checks in the regression 
model were preformed.  
Austin Board of Realtors Data 
The ABoR data contained mainly structural attributes, with the exception of square 
footage, lot size, and school test scores. Specifically, this dataset had the energy features of 
homes recorded (See Table 3). Records for 15-20% of all new homes made in the Austin 
area are included in the ABoR data set; 16,973 home sales transactions marked as new, under 
construction, or to be built are in the dataset from 1997-2004. Spatially, the ABoR data is has 
the biggest range stretching out radially 50 miles from the central business district in 
downtown. There was no information of home sales about the other 80-85% of Austin 
homes sold.  
 
                                                 
7 Source: Data purchased by Will Bradshaw under special agreement with ABoR 
8 Source: Data provided by special agreement with GBP 
9 Source: Data purchased by Will Bradshaw from TaxNetUSA 
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Austin Green Building Program Data 
The GBP is run by Austin Energy, a municipally owned electric company.  The 
residential rating system records information on 136 variables of sustainable building in five 
categories- water, energy, materials, health and safety, and community.  In order to be 
eligible for a green rating 13 initial requirements must be fulfilled such as the use of low 
volatile organic compound paints in the interior (Green Builder Residential Program Version 
6.1). The other 123 green features are assigned a point value from one to six points 
depending on the feature.  Each feature has a particular number of points associated with it 
i.e. double pane windows are worth two points and tile or metal roofing are worth three 
points. The points for each feature are awarded entirely or not at all; there are no partial 
points allowed.   These points are totaled by category and then summed for a grand total to 
reveal the green rating. The green rating for a home is assigned one to five stars based on its 
grand total as seen in Table 4.  There are a total of 281 possible points yet the maximum 
score is 266 due to some features being mutually exclusive. One caution of this dataset is 
that builders/developers self-report the results, although specific tests (referred to as 
commissioning) are carried out by independent technicians to earn four and five star ratings 
(Bradshaw 2005). This self-reporting could bias the results, but can also be offset since a 
builder/developer would not want to soil their reputation and brand name if they want to 
continue doing business in the area.                   
Travis County Appraisal District Data 
 The TCAD data provides square feet and lot size information which were absent in 
the ABoR data. These variables are taken from property tax records that are administered at 
the county level. Approximately, 80% of Austin is located in Travis County. Will Bradshaw 
requested property tax information on homes built between1997-2004, and 38,928 records 
were provided.  
Williamson County Appraisal District Data 
 Williamson County is situated on the north side of the city and contains ~20% of 
Austin. WCAD data provided the additional square footage and lot size information in 
property taxes for ABoR and GBP data. Bradshaw requested tax information for homes 
built between 1997 and 2004, and received 32,563 records.  
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Data Matching 
The method used to join energy features from the ABoR dataset onto Bradshaw’s 
dataset was through a spatial join using Geographical Information Systems (GIS).  The 
spatial join used x and y coordinates to join the ABoR and Bradshaw datasets. The spatial 
join required that the addresses be geo-coded. The City of Austin street location file was 
used for adding an x and y coordinate (geo-coding) based on address in the ABoR data. With 
both datasets having an x and y coordinate, they were concatenated into a unique identifier. 
GIS used this unique identifier to join the ABoR and Bradshaw datasets together and yielded 
3,553 matches. From the 3,553 observations, there were 824 observations with lot size 
information. The final data set of 824 observations was used for the study and hereinafter 
will be referred to as the energy dataset.  Figure 8 illustrates the matching process. 
Summary Statistics & Correlation Matrix 
Table 5 lists and defines the variables in the energy dataset that were acknowledged 
as potential variables to be incorporated in the hedonic model. The expected sign were 
included as an ex ante predictor of a positive or negative beta in the hedonic model. The 
variables in Table 5 were selected based on the following premises. First, hedonic research 
and literature has put emphasis on similar variables for determining the price of a home 
(Malpezzi 2002, Thibodeau 1998, and Miller 2002). Second, I wanted strong predictors of 
home value based in the Austin real estate market for this particular energy dataset.  Third, I 
did not want high correlation between the independent variables.  
Table 6 shows us that over half the homes have views and sit on ~0.4 of an acre. 
Structurally, the homes in the sample on average have 2,800 square feet, are fairly new, and 
average two energy features. From a neighborhood perspective there is high ownership 
(82%) compared to the US Census Austin profile which specifies a 44.8% owner occupied 
rate (See Figure 9).  The average distance from the city center was 10 miles and the average 
price a home was $357,000 which begins to imply that the sample is mainly suburban. For 
confirmation, we look at the spatial distribution of the sample in Figure 10.  
The majority of the spatial distribution in the sample is concentrated to the west of 
Interstate 35 and outside the city limits, which would be expected for new development. 
Clustering happens between highway 620 and Lake Travis, to the southwest of the 
intersection of highway 1 and 360, and in the north along Interstate 35. Since many of the 
homes fall to the west of Interstate 35, the interstate acts as a Northeast-Southwest axis and 
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physical boundary. Figure 11 shows that most of the homes in the sample fall outside 
established Austin neighborhoods boundaries. We would expect this phenomenon for newly 
constructed homes since they are likely to be built on previously undeveloped land. This 
concentration of homes in future planning areas and non-neighborhood planning areas 
shows us where new homes are likely to be situated. This concentration clustering is brought 
up in Bradshaw’s 2005 study and dataset which introduces self- selection11.  The Lake Travis 
area could be captured in the views variable, while the other polygons in Figure 11could be 
captured through school test scores and percent owner occupied. 
   Table 7 shows the correlation between variables in Table 5. The correlation table 
was consistent with expectations on sales price; sales price was highly correlated with 
Square_FT (64.3%) and LotSize_SF (46.7%). For lot characteristics, LotSize_SF was not 
highly correlated with FloodCode, but was with ViewCode (22.9%). We would expect high 
correlation with ViewCode and LotSize_SF because people are likely to pay more for views on 
the land that they buy. Structurally, Square_FT was highly correlated with Beds (49.6%), dPool 
(27.9%), FirePlaces (39.3%), GarageCap (47.5%), NumLivingR (54.6%), Stories (31.2%), and 
TotBath (58.8%).  Neighborhood characteristics, PerBlack, PerHispan, PerOwnOcc, and  
PerPassAll were all highly correlated with each other. I was also concerned with the high 
correlation of the neighborhood characteristics and energy variables because many of the 
correlations were significant. This meant that there was little difference between variables 
and represented redundancy. After running preliminary regression models on the energy 
dataset it was apparent that these aforementioned variables competed for predictive power 
and significance in the hedonic model.   
 
 
_________________________ 
11 This concentration issue introduces some difficulty with self-selection. Location efficiency (i.e. being close to 
existing services, already established infrastructure, and already developed areas) is an important part of the 
green building ethic. While many of the homes rated as green by the Austin program are well outside of 
downtown and most are part of “greenfield” developments (developments built on previously undeveloped 
land), they do not stretch as far into the outlying areas around the city as homes which are not rated. This may 
have something to do with where the green building program has chosen to rate homes, but it also may have 
something to do with where marketing a green building is useful for homebuilders. If someone is going to sell a 
home in a new ex-urban community twenty-five miles outside of downtown, it is likely that the target buyer is 
less concerned about environmental issues as someone looking to buy a home in downtown or even a new, 
inner-ring suburb. This self-selection problem crops up in several other ways throughout this study (Bradshaw 
2005). 
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Dropped Variables 
To minimize bias in the sample, certain variables were condensed or removed. Due 
to high inter-correlation and competition in the neighborhood characteristics PerBlack, 
PerHispan, and PerOwnOcc were dropped because PerPassAll was a relatively better predictor 
of price. The structural variables Beds and NumlivingR were eliminated because Square_FT and 
LotSize_SF were better predictors of price. dPool was dropped while fireplaces and garages 
were recoded into dummy variables to better represent the underlying data.  Stories was taken 
out because it was not significant in the preliminary regression models and had low variation.  
YearBuilt was collinear with the year of sale and therefore not used. The energy variables 
dSolarHeat and dSolarWtrHtr were disregarded because there were no observations in the 
sample and were not included in Table 6 or   Table 7.  EnergySum was highly correlated with 
other energy variables, as it is an indicator summing up the presence of these features, and 
was not included in the final regression.  
Recoding 
Fireplaces, GarageCap, and TotBath were variables that were deemed to be significant in 
preliminary regression models, but needed to be condensed in order to be representative of 
the underlying distribution or to remove outliers. In order to capture most of the variation in 
the variable the frequency at which they occurred were looked at (See Table 8, Table 9, & 
Table 10). For Fireplaces, 87% of the sample had at least one fireplace, so the dummy variable 
(dFireplace1G) for one or more fireplaces was created as it would significantly represent 
homes with a fireplace.  The dummy variable GarageCap3 was created in order to make 
comparisons to homes with two, one, or zero garages. Ideally, we would have liked to have 
made a comparison to homes without a garage to those that did, but homes without a garage 
was a small minority of 3.8% of the sample. The dispersion of TotBath was large and 
displayed bimodal characteristics. There were a large amount of homes with half to two-and-
half bathrooms and three or more; therefore, dTotBath2p5 and dTotBath3G were produced to 
represent homes with less than two-and-half baths and those with more than three baths 
respectively.   
Principal Component Factor Analysis 
 Before reaching the final dataset, principal component analysis was employed on the 
energy variables. The purpose of principal component factor analysis was used to remove 
redundant (highly correlated) energy variables from the dataset, and replace them with a 
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smaller number of uncorrelated variables that will explain a large portion of the variation 
found amongst these variables.  
The principal components method of extraction begins by finding a linear 
combination of variables (a component) that accounts for as much variation in the original 
variables as possible. It then finds another component that accounts for as much of the 
remaining variation as possible and is uncorrelated with the previous component, continuing 
in this way until there are as many components as original variables. Usually, a few 
components will account for most of the variation, and these components can be used to 
replace the original variables (Statistical Package for Social Sciences v 12.2).  
 Table 11 shows us the extracted components with eigen values over the value of 
one. The principal component method for the energy variables was able to reduce the 
number of energy variables examined from ten to five while explaining 74% of the variation.  
For interpretation purposes the components were rotated using a VARIMAX procedure 
with Kaiser Normalization while ensuring zero correlation (See  Table 11 and   Table 7).  
Table 7 shows zeros for all correlations between the factors.  
Table 12 illustrates which energy variables load most heavily on the five components, 
and is where Table 13 is derived from for grouping of the variables. For factor one 
dZoneAirHeat loaded most heavily (0.829), factor two on dSolarScreen (0.794), factor three on 
dStormWin (0.838), factor four on dStormDoor (0.928), and factor five on dWhlHouseFan (0.97).  
These components were then labeled by the dominant characteristic (See Table 13) that at 
least had a 70% loading of the variance. One caution in Table 13 is that within each 
grouping one factor may be more important than the others. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
I begin with how real estate theorists and professionals would likely price and value 
energy features in the residential marketplace. Hedonic models are an econometric view of 
pricing the features that comprise an entire finished product. Hedonic modeling has been 
the one of the primary pricing methods of appraisal for over 40 years, and continues to 
advance and become a standard way of valuating homes (Dubin 1998).   
Kelvin Lancaster is regarded as the developer of the hedonic model and its 
application to real estate price estimation. “A New Approach to Consumer Theory” (1966)  
suggests that the pre-1966 methods of valuation must “Break away from the traditional 
approach that goods are the direct objects of utility and, instead,  supposing that it is the 
properties or characteristics of goods from which utility is derived” (Lancaster 1966). That is 
to say Lancaster’s econometric foundations yielded a way to model what a house is and how 
it can be priced quantitatively. The advantages of using a hedonic model for residential 
homes are three-fold. First, one can assume that a house is composed by the sum of its 
features. Secondly, hedonic models correct for changes in quality over time. Lastly, they can 
be used to assess the value of a home without specific market transaction data.  
Lancaster’s model not only works for housing, but other commodities such as cars (A.T. 
Court1939 & Griliches 1961).  
More recent and refined derivations of the hedonic model for estimating pricing of 
homes more accurately have come from Stephen Malpezzi’s “Hedonic Pricing Models: A 
Selective and Applied Review” (2002) and others such as James Follain and Emmanuel 
Jimenez’s “Estimating the Demand for Housing Characteristics: A Survey and Critique” 
(1985), and Stephen Sheppard’s “Hedonic Analysis of Housing Markets” (1999).  The 
theoretical foundations of these works stem from the work of Kain and Quigley 1970, who 
concluded that residential services, e.g. schools, sewer, etc, have an impact on the price a 
consumer is willing to pay for a home. The culmination of hedonic research has provided 
Equation 1 (on page 34).                                           
While this refined hedonic model is more accurate and tailored to the residential 
sector than Lancaster’s original model it still has a few drawbacks. There are three drawbacks 
that researchers and Malpezzi often confront are:  
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1. Heterogeneity of houses and consumer preference  
2. Identification of whether problem is from the supply or the demand side 
3. Housing market is cyclical (disequilibrium), yet model assumes equilibrium 
      (Malpezzi 2002) 
 
The heterogeneity problem of homes and the features they contain can make them 
very different from one another; this variety makes it difficult to price them as a single 
commodity. Furthermore, consumers themselves possess very different preferences so they 
purchase differing bundles of attributes. Malpezzi suggests that this issue produces non-
linear measures, but can be corrected with “Second Stage” hedonic modeling; where non-
linear mathematical functions such as the log function are used.  
The identification problem has been a classical dilemma in economics.  
Distinguishing whether supply or demand are the causal factors can be ambiguous because 
lack of reliable instruments of analysis (Malpezzi 2002). The identification problem is 
attributed to unobservable characteristics or endogenous variables not captured in the 
model. Within the scope of hedonic modeling, Diamond and Smith (1985) look at demand 
for individual characteristics of homes and locations. Diamond and Smith conclude that 
estimating the price elasticity of supply (i.e. sensitivity of quantity based on price) does not 
assist in estimation of household demand characteristics. They put forward that price 
elasticity of supply is a non-linear trait in hedonic modeling, and could be addressed through 
non-linear transformations of endogenous variable(s) in the demand function. Bloomquist 
and Worley (1982) look at the demand side of amenities in housing and use non-linear 
transformations in their studies. They concluded that a Two stage or “Second Step” method 
with their 0.1 power transformation is superior to linear hedonics using a Box-Cox method, 
but bias varies from attribute to attribute in their model. To give an example of magnitude: 
the number of rooms variable in the power transformation function overestimated by three 
percent while the traditional linear hedonic overestimated by 14-56%. However, they also 
conclude that the 0.1 power transformation “is not significantly different from the log form 
of the hedonic” (Bloomquist & Worley, 1985). Sheppard (1999) concludes that, in addition 
to model specification and measurement error, that “nonlinearity in household budgets 
implies endogenous determination of attribute price” (Sheppard, 23, 1999).  This means that 
non-linear factors arise within the model, usually in the error term, that could not explain the 
variation in a house attribute price.  Ivar Ekland et al in their paper “Identifying Hedonic 
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Models” (2007) have showed that the hedonic models are “Generically non-linear. It’s the 
linearization of a fundamentally non-linear model that produces the form of the 
identification problem that dominates[s] discussion in the applied literature.” These studies 
grapple with a difficult question and the identification problem continues to make 
conclusions somewhat ambiguous. For now the approximations caused by the identification 
problem will have to be accepted and acknowledged until further methodologies are 
developed.  
The equilibrium and disequilibrium problem is an issue also since hedonic modeling 
assumes equilibrium, when in reality the market is in a constant state of change of price 
fluctuations.  Malpezzi suggests to “estimate hedonic price functions using only observation 
in or near equilibrium” (Malpezzi 2002). Abraham and Hendershott tried to look at this 
phenomenon but could not conclude any concrete evidence, since their results varied across 
the US (Abraham & Hendershott 1994). The static nature of the model will yield a snapshot 
in time rather than a dynamically changing model over time. 
Hedonic Model 
This statistical model was chosen because of the heterogeneous nature of real estate 
in the sample. Specifically each home has a diverse range of components and features which 
is difficult to estimate the demand for. Hedonic models estimate prices for individual 
characteristics bundled together to form a good; they assume there is an autonomous market 
for each individual characteristic e.g. double pane windows. Equation 1 shows a general 
model of a hedonic equation. 
Equation 1: Standard Hedonic Attributes 
V=f (S, N, L, C, T) where                                                
 
V= value of house 
S= structural characteristics 
N= neighborhood characteristics 
L= location within the market 
C= contract conditions 
T= time the value, V, is observed                         (Malpezzi 2002) 
 
The statistical method underlying the model is ordinary least squares regression 
analysis. The regression analysis can tell us maximum likelihoods of occurrence and 
correlations of home features to price in a multivariate setting. Hedonic modeling is used 
extensively in the real estate literature and will be employed in this study. We used log-linear 
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regression in the hedonic model because it took into consideration the economic law of 
diminishing marginal utility and was a good estimator of house prices.  Since we use a log-
linear regression we can interpret the beta coefficients as a percent change in the home’s 
value given a change in the independent variable.  
Hypothesis Testing 
I first develop a baseline model of transaction, housing, and neighborhood attributes 
that explain house prices in this sample. From there I add the energy variables to see if there 
is any explanatory power and to see if the individual coefficients on the energy variables are 
significantly different from zero.  
Specifying the Regression Models 
In order to reduce the effects of co-linearity and competition of significance between 
variables in the model I started with a baseline model. The baseline model (See Table 14) 
 was created for the variables that are well known in literature and practice to explain 
a large portion of the variation in home price.  Choosing variables for the baseline was also 
supported through the relationships shown in the correlation tables.  LotSize_SF and 
Square_FT were strong predictors of house price, DistFrCtyCtr_Miles controlled for clustering 
of homes and neighborhood attributes, the square of LotSize_SF and Square_FT were used 
to detect non-linear relationships, and dClosedYear controlled for markets fluctuations. 
The baseline model was created as a basis from which comparison would be drawn 
upon for keeping an additional variable added to the model from list of variables in Table 5.  
For the baseline, a variable from each attribute in Equation 1 was used, except a 
neighborhood characteristic. By using this baseline model it would be easier to see changes 
in standard errors, R2, and significance by adding additional variables. The motivation for 
small standard errors was to minimize non-random variation. A higher R2 would yield more 
predictive power for the overall model. Significance of each variable would offer confidence 
in reporting a particular variable affect on house price.  
From the baseline model, an additional variable would be added and kept in the 
hedonic model if the addition of the variable lowered the standard errors of the baseline 
model, increased the R2, and/or if the variable was significant or could explain a trend.  This 
was iterated with all the variables in Table 5 to generate Table 15. To see how the energy 
factors would affect the standard errors, R2, and to see if they were significant Table 16 is 
shown separately to compare to Table 15. In addition to the energy factors, I wanted to 
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know if a green rating had anything to say about price and if it was positively or negatively 
associated with home value; thus Table 17 was created.   
Results 
 The results of Table 16 are interpreted as follows: 
• These 23 variables explain 81.6% of the variation in Austin home prices. 
• The significance value of the F statistic in the ANOVA table means that the 
variation in price explained by the model is most likely not due to chance. 
• All the variables except Square_FT, REGR factor score 3(energy retrofits), and REGR 
factor score 5(energy accessories) were all statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level as indicated by the t-statistic (>|1.96|). By being significant we know these 
variables contribute to the model. 
• All 23 variables have a less than 9% chance of its coefficient being equal to zero as 
indicated by the standard errors. 
• Distance from the State Capitol building in Austin decreases the value of the home 
at a rate of 3.1% per mile. 
• Each additional square foot of livable space increases the value of the home by 
0.004% and each additional square foot of land increases the value of the home by 
0.0006%. 
• Having two-and-half bathrooms adds 13.4% to the price of a homes relative to zero 
to two bathrooms. Three or more bathrooms adds 39.3% to price relative to a home 
with three bathrooms.   
• REGR factor score I (HVAC systems and controls) was significant in explaining house 
price and each additional HVAC energy feature of REGR factor score I would add 
3.98% to the value of the home. 
• REGR factor score II (Solar Screens) was significant in explaining house price and each 
additional solar screen decreases the value of a home by 5.2%. 
• REGR factor score IV (Storm Doors) was significant in explaining house price and 
each additional storm door decreases the value of the home by 2.9%. 
• REGR factor score III and V (Energy retrofits and attributes) were not significant in 
predicting price and did not contribute to the model. 
 
If we were to solve for price in Table 16’s regression model we would have the following 
equation:  
 
Price= Exp[(constant) -0.03*DistFrCtyCtr_Miles+… -0.006*REGR factor score 5)  
                                                                                                                                                (Equation 2 ) 
 
The addition of the dGreen variable in Table 17 was insignificant, did not contribute 
to the model, and had a price premium of 5.6%. Bradshaw’s study had a similar finding. 
When he did not control for distance he found a 3.6% price premium for green rated homes.  
When Bradshaw controlled for distance that premium dropped to a 0.73% price premium. 
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In both Bradshaw’s regressions, gGreen was insignificant in contributing to the model in 
predicting price.  
Robustness 
 Given we had reliability and interpretation issues in the data at early stages of the 
study I wanted to perform robustness checks on the tests we ran.  First, I made sure that the 
number of energy feature observations was comparable to the original ABoR 65,000 
observation dataset. Both the original ABoR dataset and the energy dataset had ~30% of 
homes without energy features; thus they were comparable.  Next, I ran descriptive statistics 
on the energy dataset for homes with no energy features and those with at least one energy 
feature (See Table 18 and Table 19). Table 18 and Table 19 showed us that the means were 
comparable to the energy dataset sample with possible discrepancies in lot size and sales 
price.  
Next I ran the regression with homes that had at least one energy feature (See Table 
21). I found that factors I, II, and IV were still significant but now factor II (Solar screens) 
becomes significant. The component factors with homes that had at least one energy factor 
explained 68% of the variance which is comparable to the 74% I got earlier (See Table 22).  
The components loaded on the same energy variables with the exception of factor IV 
(exterior attributes) (See Table 23). Factor IV (exterior attributes) now loaded on ceiling fans 
whereas before it had loaded on storm doors. Factor II’s (solar screens) highest two loading 
factors switched, before it was most heavily loaded on solar screens and now it was on 
double pane windows; the loading scores were very close now whereas before the difference 
was larger.  
In Table 21 we see that factor one is still significant, positive, and nearly three times 
larger in magnitude from the final regression model (Table 16) with a 9.5% price premium 
compared to a 3.9. Factor two is still negative, significant, and drops in magnitude a little less 
than a percent. Factor three now becomes significant, still negative, and increase by a little 
over one percent in magnitude. Factor four now becomes insignificant, becomes positive, 
and drops almost 2.5% in magnitude. These results suggest that energy factors one through 
three are robust and reliable to make conclusions on. Factor four (Storm doors) changes sign 
and factor five was never significant therefore these features are not very robust.  
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Discussion 
The role of the energy variables relative to dGreen is that the energy variables bring a 
level of detail in understanding on how sales price is affected through energy features. The 
green rating encompasses energy features (See Figure 12), and I focus on the energy features 
because it is the most substantive in terms of homebuyers noticing the value in investing in 
these products.  However, the energy features come from the ABoR and do not measure all 
of the GBP features in Figure 12. We can see this most visibly in   Table 7 where dGreen is 
negatively correlated with all the energy variables except dWhlHouseFan  This leads me to 
believe that the GBP green rating looks at different aspects than the ABoR. When 
comparing Table 3 to Table 20  one can see that the overlapping features are heating 
ventilation & cooling and solar aspects. The two organizations differ by “green” design, 
lighting, and appliances. Being green does not always measure energy; it is only one aspect in 
the Austin GBP. We would expect that the overlapping features would explain some 
variation in price while the other features would explain very little in price. This expectation 
was for the most part true as seen in Table 17.  
The interpretation of the green rating or energy factor is intended for home-to-home 
or factor-to-factor comparison. The rating or factor says nothing about how the energy 
features are actually used. For example, a family who leaves the ceiling fan(s) on all day and 
night versus a family who only uses the fan when they are home. The effect on price will 
depend on how these features are used and maintained. Assumptions on average use and 
time are assumed to make fair comparisons. The green rating is supposed to play a role that 
has a direct proportional relationship to environmental health; the higher the green rating the 
lower the home’s harm to the environment and humans. From the model in Table 17, we 
can say that having a green rating has a positive relationship with sales price, but is not 
significant in contributing to the model which does not tell us much. If the green rating was 
significant we could speculate that the market perceives the rating to be helping the 
environment while adding value to the home. 
Variable Interpretation  
For the green rating, I decided to go with a binary variable because there was not 
enough variation in the amount of stars a home received for a green rating (See Table 24).  
The energy variables had high correlation with each other so principal component analysis 
was performed. Table 16 shows us that this sample follows a mono-centric city model with a 
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decrease in price the further a home is situated from downtown. Lot size and square feet are 
strong predictors of price. Large homes showed that garages, fireplaces, and bathrooms were 
very important with its positive sign in Square_FtSqrd. Market fluctuations can be seen in the 
ClosedYear variable; where, relative to 1997, the ABoR had a large amount of sales between 
1998 and 2001. The year 2001 had the largest amount of home sales. Structurally, having one 
or more fireplaces, a three-car garage, two and a half or three bathrooms was very useful in 
selling a home in Austin.  Strong school test scores were a significant consideration for home 
buyers. A home fully or partially in a designated flood code negatively affected a homes sales 
prices. A broadly defined view helped considerably in sales price. Component factor I or 
HVAC attributes have a fairly high correlation with sales price at 23.1%. A consumer could 
fathomably keep approximately 4% on the value of his home by not investing in HVAC 
features but would pay that money in the future on operating expenses. Contrarily, a 
homeowner could pay 4% upfront at the point-of-sale and not hassle with installation and 
receive the benefit of lower operating expenses in the future. 
 The hedonic models suggest that certain energy features are actively priced. 
Specifically, features of homes represented here by HVAC systems and controls, solar 
screens, and storm doors seem to be actively priced and incorporated in the value of a home 
as suggested by their significance. HVAC energy features had a positive relationship with 
price, while solar screens and storm doors were negatively associated with price.  
 When I talked with real estate agents from Austin she said that most new home 
buyers (typically the younger population and the largest group) do not ask or are not 
concerned with energy features since it will cost more. New or first time homebuyers are 
concerned about the basic structural aspects of a home, such as bathrooms and bedrooms.  
The retirement homebuyers, a much smaller population relative to new homebuyers in 
Austin, do ask about energy features, but are marginally concerned with those aspects. From 
her perspective, the average builder does not include energy features in homes or market 
them heavily.  
Another Austin real estate agent said homebuyers when confronted with energy 
features will look for double pane or low- emittance windows, minimum air conditioning, 
and insulation requirements if they are affordable features. He also stated that wear and tear 
of solar screens happens sooner than expected and fraying of the screen becomes a problem 
and are no longer functional. He suggests window film as a substitute for buyers looking into 
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a home with solar screens. He also stated that most solar screens are “plain ugly” and only 
the most expensive ones are transparent.  This attractiveness feature may play a role in how 
homebuyers emotionally attach themselves to a home. Lastly, the real estate agent said that 
the hot climate in Austin deters homebuyers from using storm doors.  
From the results in Table 16 we can estimate that a homebuyer that invests in 
HVAC energy features would expect to save 3.97% from the value of their home. For the 
average home in this sample that’s a little over $14,000 in savings from having HVAC energy 
features. In relation to the Metcalf and Hassett study they computed a median internal rate 
of return for energy cost savings to the cost of attic insulation to be 9.7%.  
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CONCLUSION 
  
From the regression results we see that HVAC systems and controls, solar screens, 
and storm doors are all significant in explaining variation in home prices for this sample of 
new homes in Austin, Texas. Since the variable indicating the presence of an energy efficient 
HVAC system and control system is positive and statistically different from zero, it suggests 
that the expected cost savings of this energy feature is capitalized in the price of a home. 
However, we see that while HVAC systems and controls are positively associated with price 
solar screens and storm doors are negatively associated with price. This leads me to believe 
that the market is valuing energy features differently given the information they have.  
As more research is conducted on the energy efficiency of homes, we expect that 
consumers will make more informed decisions about incorporating these features in the 
future.   However, energy efficient products will have to be competitive in price to 
conventional products in order to have scales of economy.  The home improvement and 
construction sectors will also need training on how to install and service new energy efficient 
products if they differ from conventional products.  Energy efficient products particular to 
orientation towards the sun or other design specifications will take time to become common 
practice as the information is absorbed and learning curves become smaller. 
The environmental dilemma is not necessarily resolved with more information, 
however, and thus changes in production of homes with energy features will most likely 
happen through government and legal channels.  Political pressures rather than market 
forces will be the motivation for some changes. Building codes, requirements, and 
compliance will be the targeted aspects that will affect the homebuilding industry, and within 
those codes product minimums and efficiency standards would be mandated.  The Austin 
Climate Protection Plan is well intentioned for energy efficiency in the home sector, but may 
not be the most optimal method in achieving energy efficiency in homes because of 
increased cost to taxpayers, oversight of new regulations, and potential to deter home buyers 
from investing in the Austin area. The greatest impact the Austin Climate Protection Plan 
could have is making policy when homeowners consider reinvesting in home features 
because in time a new water heater will always be needed, and what better way to invest than 
in an environmentally conscious way.  The use of energy audits may facilitate the decision to 
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reinvest or not, as well as make it easier for the homeowner to get contractors if they decide 
to reinvest in energy features.  
Many people do not expect that energy prices will not go back down to 1980 prices.  
The costs borne by homebuyers when energy prices are high should continue to provide 
incentives to lower those costs through increased energy efficiency in the home. Education 
on energy efficiency rather than political force may be the best policy encourage chioices to 
include energy efficient features in homes.  Education coupled with market forces will last 
longer than a single administration’s policies.   
Future Areas of Research 
Further research on how homebuyers access available information about energy 
efficiency is necessary to better understand the energy paradox. Data on why home builders 
do not market energy efficiency is needed as well, especially if new homebuyers feel that 
those attributes are desirable.  A variable that captures the climate of Austin is missing from 
this study and could help to explain the impact of certain features since some “green” 
features are design and orientation specific.  Other research could investigate affordability 
challenges that new rules and regulations about energy efficient features will impose on 
certain types of households.  One aspect to look at could be the effect, before and after, the 
Austin Climate Protction Plan to see if the energy efficiency market grows and if the prices 
of homes increases. Finally, information and research on the construction phase of 
homebuilding would greatly help in understanding the actual costs of building more energy 
efficient homes. 
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APPENDIX A- FIGURES 
 
Fossil Fuel Production Prices, 1949-2005
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Figure 1: Fossil Fuel Production Prices. The average percent difference of Coal was +0.14%/yr, Gas 
was +6.65%/yr, Crude Oil was +3.98%/yr, and the Fossil Fuel Composite was 2.86%/yr from 1949-
2005.Take note of the spike in the 1970s with the oil crisis. 
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US Energy Consumption by Sector, 1949-2005
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Source: US Energy Information Agency-Annual energy Review 2005
Created by Antonio Amado March 26,2007
 
Figure 2:  The average % change in Residential was +2.5%/yr, Commercial was +2.92%/yr, Industrial 
was +1.49%/yr, and transportation was +2.30%/yr for the time period of 1949-2005. 
 
 
US Energy Total Consumption & by Sector, 1949-2005
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Source: US Energy Information Agency-Annual energy Review 2005
Created by Antonio Amado March 26,2007  
Figure 3: The average % difference in Total Consumption was +2.10%/yr from 1949-2005. 
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Residential Energy Source, 1949-2005
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Source: US Energy Information Agency-Annual Energy Review 2005
Created by Antonio Amado March 26,2007
*Total losses are calculated as the primary energy consumed by the electric power sector minus the energy content of electricity retail sales.  Total losses are allocated  to the end-use 
sectors in proportion to each sector's share of total electricity retail sales. See Note, "Electrical System Energy Losses," in EIA Annual Energy Review 2005  
Figure 4: The average percent difference for Coal was -7.26%/yr, Natural Gas was +3.03%/yr, 
Petroleum was 0.83%/yr, BioMass was -1.18%/yr, GeoThermal was +7.72%/yr (recording started in 
1989, average was taken from this year forward), and Solar was +0.74%/yr (recording started in 1989, 
average was taken from this year forward) for the years 1949-2005.  
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Residential Energy Source Totals, 1949-2005
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Source: US Energy Information Agency-Annual Energy Review 2005
Created by Antonio Amado March 26,2007
*Total losses are calculated as the primary energy consumed by the electric power sector minus the energy content of electricity retail sales.  Total losses are allocated  to the end-use 
sectors in proportion to each sector's share of total electricity retail sales. See Note, "Electrical System Energy Losses," in EIA Annual Energy Review 2005
 
Figure 5: The average percent difference for Fossil Fuel Total was +1.27%/yr, Renewable Total was -
0.93%/yr, System Loss was +4.46%/yr, and the Residential Total was +2.50%/yr. 
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 Figure 6: Household consumption by region   
 Source: US Energy Information Agency Annual Energy Review 2005 
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Figure 7: 2005 Severance Taxes by State, 
Source: State Legislatures 
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ABoR Datset
65,535 obs.
Logic Rules
6,302 obs.
Common Attribute
1. Address
2. X & Y coordinate
Joined (Spatial) Dataset
3,553 obs.
Those with Lot Size info
824 obs.
Bradshaw’s Dataset
5,212 obs.
Those with lot size info
3,163 obs.
Observations which will be joined
Figure 8: Data Matching Process
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   Figure 9: US Census 2000 General Demographics for Austin 
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           Figure 9: US Census 2000 General Demographics for Austin  
 - 56 -
 
           Figure 9: US Census 2000 General Demographics for Austin 
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           Figure 9: US Census 2000 General Demographics for Austin  
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   Figure 10: Sample Spatial Distribution
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Figure 11: Submarkets for Green Homes 
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Green Rating
1) Energy 
2) Community 
3) Health & Safety 
4) Materials 
5) Water 
Figure 12: Green Rating Sections
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APPENDIX B- TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Advocates versus detractors on development costs for energy efficient features. 
 ADVOCATE DETRACTOR 
Construction Cost (Somewhat known) 
~0-5% Premium  
(Unknown) 
~10-15% Premium  
Operating Cost (Somewhat known) 
Significant Savings (There 
are case studies of 
individual buildings but not 
an entire market) 
(Unknown) 
No significant savings 
Sales Price (Somewhat known) 
~2-3% premium 
 (Unknown) 
No value added 
 
                                    
                                     Table 2: Logic Rules for ABoR Matching Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Table 3: ABoR Energy Variables 
Ceiling Fan(s) 
Double Pane Windows 
Energy Audit 
Heat Pump 
Programmable Thermostat 
Solar Heat 
Solar Screen 
Solar Water Heater 
Storm Door(s) 
Storm Windows 
Whole House Fan 
Zone Air/Heat 
 
Rule Deletes Total 
ABoR data set 0 65,535 
SalesPrice>$55K 20,000 40,751 
0<BathsFull>=7 15  40,736 
BathsHalf<=6 229 40,507 
Beds>BedsMain 24,211 16,296 
Beds>BedsUpper 6,293 9,373 
ListPrice>=$30K 0 9,373 
SalesPrice>=$30K 0 9,373 
SqFtTotal>=400 3,063 6,310 
SqFtTotal<=25K 7 6,303 
Beds<=13 0 6,303 
NumLivngRm<=6 1 6,302 
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                                                      Table 4: Green Rating Criteria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rating Total Points 
* 40-59 
** 60-89 
*** 90-129 
**** 130-179 
***** 180-266 
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Table 5: Full Variable List 
Variable Definition Expected Sign
Lot 
Characteristics
LotSize_SF Lot size in square feet; Source: Property tax records +
LotSize_SFSqrd LotSize_SF^2, The square of LotSize_SF -
ViewCode Has a view (0= No view, 1=Home has view) +
Structural 
Characteristics
Beds Number  of bedrooms +
dPool Has a pool (1=yes, 0= no) +
dGreen Dummy for a green rating (1=yes, 0=no) +
dCeilingFan Dummy for ceiling fans(s) (1=yes, 0= no) +
dDblePaneWin Dummy for  double pane windows  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dEnergyAudit Dummy for an energy audit  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dHeatPump Dummy for a heat pump  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dProgrThermo Dummy for a programmable thermostat  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dSolarHeat Dummy for solar heat  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dSolarScreen Dummy for solar screens  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dSolarWtrHtr Dummy for a solar water heater  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dStormDoor Dummy for storm door(s)  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dStormWin Dummy for storm windows  (1=yes, 0= no) +
dWhlHouseFan Dummy for a whole house fan (1=yes, 0= no) +
dZoneAirHeat Dummy for zone air/heat (1=yes, 0= no) +
EnergySum Number of energy features a home has +
Fireplaces Number of fireplaces +
dFireplace1G Dummy for one or more fireplaces in house +
GarageCap Number of garage parking spaces +
GarageCap3 Dummy for three garages (1=yes, 0=no) +
NumLivingR Number of living rooms +
REGR factor score 1 Linear transformation, energy variable component score 1 +
REGR factor score 2 Linear transformation, energy variable component score 2 +
REGR factor score 3 Linear transformation, energy variable component score 3 +
REGR factor score 4 Linear transformation, energy variable component score 4 +
REGR factor score 5 Linear transformation, energy variable component score 5 +
Square_FT Livable square fottage of home; Source: Property tax records +
Square_FTSqrd Square_FT^2, the square of Square_FT -
Stories Number of stories (1=1-story, 2=more than 1-story) +/-
TotBath Number of bathrooms (TotBath=fullbaths=0.5*halfbaths) +
dTotBath2p5 Dummy for two and a half TotBath (1=yes, 0=no) +
dTotBath3G Dummy for three or more TotBath (1=yes, 0=no) +
YearBuilt Year in which home was constructed +/-
Neighborhood 
Characteristics
PerBlack Percentage of black residents in census tract -
PerHispan Percentage of hispanic residents in census tract -
PerOwnOcc Percentage of owner-occupied housing in the census tract +
Locational 
Characteristic
Radial distance in miles from the home to the State Capitol -
(an approximation of the distance to downtown)
Transactional 
Characteristics
ClosedYear Year in which home was sold for the first time, (1998 omitted) +
LnSalesPrice Ln(SalesPrice), the natural log of SalesPrice Dependent Var
Var=variable
-In a floodplain. Includes homes partially in a floodplain (0=Not in floodplain 1= In a floodplain)FloodCode
DistFrCtyCtr_Miles
PerPassAll Percentage of 10th graders in the school district that passed all sections of state standardized tests in 2000 +
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Table 6: Summary Statistics for Variables 
1 6 3.767 .762
1998 2004 2001 1.463
0 1 .612 .488
0 1 .533 .499
0 1 .076 .266
0 1 .873 .334
0 1 .124 .330
0 1 .059 .237
1 25 10.980 3.684
0 1 .032 .175
0 1 .256 .437
0 1 .286 .452
0 1 .011 .104
0 1 .022 .146
0 1 .004 .060
0 1 .288 .453
0 6 2.147 1.813
0 5 .964 .537
0 1 .057 .232
0 5 2.194 .673
0 1 .246 .431
3,023 665,335 16,804.079 31,180.980
9,138,529 442,670,662,225 1,253,450,676.826 15,861,915,805.196
1 7 2.158 1.000
0 68 6.527 10.385
3 87 14.632 11.022
27 97 81.999 14.870
60 94 86.609 7.504
72,000 3,700,000 356,973.766 331,496.084
929 9,410 2,759.066 1,202.168
863,041 88,548,100 9,055,896.650 9,196,880.054
1 2 1.694 .461
.5 7.5 2.917 .903
0 1 .519 .500
1998 2004 2000 1.508
Beds
ClosedYear
dCeilingFan
dDblePaneWin
dEnergyAudit
dFireplace1G
dGreen
dHeatPump
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
dPool
dProgThermo
dSolarScreen
dStormDoor
dStormWin
dWhlHouseFan
dZoneAirHeat
EnergySum
FirePlaces
FloodCode
GarageCap
GarageCap3
LotSize_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
NumLivingR
PerBlack
PerHispan
PerOwnOcc
PerPassAll
SalesPrice
Square_FT
Square_FtSqrd
Stories
TotBath
ViewCode
YearBuilt
Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
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  Table 7: Pearson Correlations for Variables 
  Line 32=Factor Score 1, Line 33=Factor Score 2, Line 34=Factor Score 3, Line 35=Factor Score 4, Line 36=Factor Score 5 
1
.024 1
.031 .162 1
.020 .069 .716 1
-.170 -.055 .220 .269 1
.018 .028 -.071 -.032 -.053 1
.063 -.041 .158 .009 -.072 -.063 1
.037 .083 -.064 -.124 -.261 -.024 .235 1
.156 .004 .016 -.012 -.026 -.047 .101 .101 1
.205 -.001 .422 .427 .135 -.052 .029 -.151 .005 1
-.145 -.121 .296 .351 .222 -.002 -.091 -.074 -.068 .090 1
-.075 .130 .084 -.065 -.030 -.004 .023 -.055 -.019 -.035 -.067 1
-.096 .197 .119 .073 .363 -.056 .103 -.261 -.027 .160 -.095 -.02 1
.019 .075 .048 .016 -.017 .038 -.015 .017 -.011 .011 -.038 -.01 -.009 1
.251 .015 .429 .407 .080 -.068 .192 -.083 .085 .622 .007 -.07 .217 .006 1
.062 .049 .818 .804 .405 -.077 .206 -.158 .012 .684 .457 .017 .267 .040 .679 1
.354 -.115 .090 .073 .020 -.016 .094 -.059 .388 .133 -.097 -.01 .010 .004 .203 .118 1
-.193 -.136 .110 .157 .579 -.045 -.040 -.156 -.014 -.072 .261 -.03 -.037 -.015 -.098 .171 .007 1
.191 -.081 .052 .032 -.255 .016 .050 .247 .036 -.089 .125 .021 -.538 .012 -.058 -.054 .141 .049 1
.242 .042 .052 .062 -.069 -.017 .080 .140 .309 .075 -.104 -.03 -.052 .035 .143 .055 .394 -.053 .052 1
.548 -.050 .036 .014 -.114 -.015 .053 -.089 .180 .199 -.140 -.04 -.107 .031 .254 .070 .432 -.149 .210 .189 1
.299 -.081 -.190 -.172 -.506 .071 .039 .198 .058 .047 -.222 .023 -.286 -.005 .078 -.214 .110 -.438 .253 .088 .285 1
.104 -.029 -.112 -.118 -.212 -.041 .008 .254 -.018 .065 -.118 -.02 -.073 .003 .084 -.092 -.021 -.194 .097 .011 .061 .413 1
-.287 -.035 .108 .106 .447 -.029 -.090 -.067 -.061 -.180 .346 -.02 -.044 -.019 -.232 .092 -.106 .573 -.032 -.093 -.282 -.610 -.339 1
-.348 .034 .093 .091 .306 -.043 -.148 -.142 -.055 -.141 .270 .015 .062 .015 -.248 .054 -.170 .410 -.212 -.110 -.348 -.643 -.284 .684 1
.497 .053 .077 .025 -.107 .001 .151 -.053 .486 .163 -.193 -.05 -.031 .017 .272 .086 .649 -.134 .094 .467 .524 .217 .022 -.255 -.287 1
.496 -.008 .046 .022 -.146 -.012 .106 .000 .279 .136 -.217 -.06 -.048 -.006 .252 .045 .393 -.198 .134 .244 .546 .341 .115 -.454 -.561 .643 1
.375 .008 -.021 -.046 -.077 .018 .033 -.104 .060 .142 -.116 .044 .027 -.004 .206 .036 .181 -.166 .090 -.025 .495 .168 .005 -.250 -.292 .238 .312 1
.706 .049 .088 .055 -.125 .004 .106 -.020 .278 .253 -.126 -.06 -.064 .028 .338 .141 .542 -.154 .137 .370 .638 .276 .022 -.283 -.347 .739 .588 .445 1
.341 .066 .036 .010 -.080 .000 .139 .116 .132 .186 -.078 .008 .061 .058 .311 .129 .238 -.182 .040 .229 .356 .188 .069 -.280 -.345 .397 .324 .310 .462 1
.010 .837 .124 .068 -.024 .040 -.041 .106 -.061 -.012 -.124 .118 .195 .072 -.025 .028 -.125 -.096 -.071 .000 -.065 -.068 -.016 -.020 .058 .003 -.035 -.005 .010 .057 1
.216 .059 .744 .704 .068 -.074 .320 -.049 .059 .778 .144 -.08 .153 .050 .829 .885 .181 -.068 .012 .136 .205 .022 .024 -.164 -.161 .231 .202 .122 .290 .228 .026 1
-.185 -.071 .357 .500 .369 .021 -.464 -.132 -.093 -.019 .794 -.05 -.268 -.041 -.203 .344 -.109 .390 .160 -.104 -.165 -.286 -.176 .454 .368 -.235 -.235 -.178 -.193 -.209 -.062 .000 1
-.177 .097 .088 .090 .792 -.056 -.044 -.319 -.038 .088 -.013 .001 .838 -.021 .087 .265 .001 .302 -.506 -.085 -.149 -.463 -.163 .227 .220 -.100 -.128 -.031 -.141 -.030 .117 .000 .000 1
-.110 .146 .280 .053 .010 -.021 .271 .017 -.002 -.128 .006 .928 -.010 .026 -.114 .122 -.012 .039 .066 -.021 -.078 -.052 -.075 .058 .067 -.053 -.073 -.011 -.084 -.020 .132 .000 .000 .000 1
.020 .104 .027 .017 -.007 .048 -.229 -.039 -.028 .034 -.112 .030 -.015 .970 -.020 -.011 -.002 -.027 -.014 .028 .035 .001 .008 -.031 .024 .004 -.007 .002 .020 .034 .101 .000 .000 .000 .000 1
1 Beds
2 ClosedYear
3 dCeilingFan
4 dDblePaneWin
5 dEnergyAudit
6 dGreen
7 dHeatPump
8 DistFrCityCtr_Miles
9 dPool
10 dProgThermo
11 dSolarScreen
12 dStormDoor
13 dStormWin
14 dWhlHouseFan
15 dZoneAirHeat
16 EnergySum
17 FirePlaces
18 FloodCode
19 dGarageCap
20 LotSize_SF
21 NumLivingR
22 PerPassAll
23 PerOwnOcc
24 PerBlack
25 PerHispan
26 SalesPrice
27 Square_FT
28 Stories
29 TotBath
30 ViewCode
31 YearBuilt
32 REGR factor score   
f l i 133 REGR factor score   
f l i 134 REGR factor score   
f l i 135 REGR factor score   
f l i 136 REGR factor score   
f l i 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
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  Table 8: Fireplace Frequency Chart 
105 12.7 12.7 12.7
665 80.7 80.7 93.4
39 4.7 4.7 98.2
11 1.3 1.3 99.5
2 .2 .2 99.8
2 .2 .2 100.0
824 100.0 100.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
   Table 9: GarageCap Frequency Chart 
31 3.8 3.8 3.8
11 1.3 1.3 5.1
565 68.6 68.6 73.7
203 24.6 24.6 98.3
12 1.5 1.5 99.8
2 .2 .2 100.0
824 100.0 100.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
 
 
    Table 10: TotBath Frequency Chart 
1 .1 .1 .1
5 .6 .6 .7
2 .2 .2 1.0
178 21.6 21.6 22.6
269 32.6 32.6 55.2
101 12.3 12.3 67.5
149 18.1 18.1 85.6
61 7.4 7.4 93.0
30 3.6 3.6 96.6
4 .5 .5 97.1
13 1.6 1.6 98.7
4 .5 .5 99.2
4 .5 .5 99.6
2 .2 .2 99.9
1 .1 .1 100.0
824 100.0 100.0
.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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 Table 11: Principal Component Analysis 
Total Variance Explained
2.778 27.776 27.776 2.778 27.776 27.776 2.500 25.003 25.003
1.351 13.506 41.282 1.351 13.506 41.282 1.477 14.768 39.771
1.221 12.211 53.493 1.221 12.211 53.493 1.363 13.629 53.400
1.039 10.393 63.886 1.039 10.393 63.886 1.046 10.459 63.860
1.007 10.071 73.957 1.007 10.071 73.957 1.010 10.098 73.957
.916 9.155 83.112
.578 5.777 88.889
.511 5.109 93.998
.348 3.484 97.482
.252 2.518 100.000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Component Scores 
Rotated Component Matrixa
.744 .357 .088 .280 .027
.704 .500 .090 .053 .017
.068 .369 .792 .010 -.007
.320 -.464 -.044 .271 -.229
.778 -.019 .088 -.128 .034
.144 .794 -.013 .006 -.112
-.078 -.047 .001 .928 .030
.153 -.268 .838 -.010 -.015
.050 -.041 -.021 .026 .970
.829 -.203 .087 -.114 -.020
dCeilingFan
dDblePaneWin
dEnergyAudit
dHeatPump
dProgThermo
dSolarScreen
dStormDoor
dStormWin
dWhlHouseFan
dZoneAirHeat
1 2 3 4 5
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 6 iterations.a. 
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Table 13: Component Analysis Loading Factors, Variable loadings > 0.70 
Component 
Factor 
Grouping Definition Score 
I HVAC systems and 
controls 
dZoneAirHeat  
(zone air/heat) 
 
dProgrammableTherm 
(programmable thermostat) 
 
dDblePaneWin  
(double pane windows) 
 
dCeilingFan (ceiling fan) 
 
.829 
 
 
.778 
 
 
.704 
 
.744 
II Solar dSolarScreen (solar screens) .794 
III Energy retrofit, 
strategies 
dStormWin(storm windows)  
 
dEnergyAudit (energy audit) 
.838 
 
.792 
IV Exterior attribute dStormDoor(storm doors) .928 
V Accessories  dWhlHouseFan (whole house fan) .970 
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Table 14: Baseline Model 
Model Summary
.784a .614 .609 .4069464198579
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), dClosed2004, LotSize_SFSqrd,
Square_FT, DistFrCityCtr_Miles, dClosed2002,
dClosed2003, dClosed1999, dClosed2001, LotSize_
SF, Square_FtSqrd, dClosed2000
a. 
 
ANOVAb
214.087 11 19.462 117.523 .000a
134.472 812 .166
348.558 823
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), dClosed2004, LotSize_SFSqrd, Square_FT,
DistFrCityCtr_Miles, dClosed2002, dClosed2003, dClosed1999,
dClosed2001, LotSize_SF, Square_FtSqrd, dClosed2000
a. 
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPriceb. 
 
Coefficientsa
11.121 .132 84.222 .000
-.024393273 .0039348399 -.138 -6.199 .000
1.174E-05 .0000009640 .562 12.174 .000
-1.317E-11 .0000000000 -.321 -7.267 .000
.0005202207 .0000405639 .961 12.825 .000
-3.167E-08 .0000000054 -.448 -5.869 .000
.1598765238 .1119501062 .088 1.428 .154
.3226914003 .1090744677 .226 2.958 .003
.4638350571 .1095273446 .314 4.235 .000
.6184920049 .1137821586 .302 5.436 .000
.4621117931 .1159383607 .203 3.986 .000
.1336998378 .1191184521 .052 1.122 .262
(Constant)
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
LotSize_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
Square_FT
Square_FtSqrd
dClosed1999
dClosed2000
dClosed2001
dClosed2002
dClosed2003
dClosed2004
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPricea. 
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Table 15: Regression Model With out Energy Variables 
Model Summary
.898a .807 .803 .2891223518720
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), ViewCode, dClosed2004,
LotSize_SFSqrd, dTotBath2p5, dClosed2003,
DistFrCityCtr_Miles, dClosed2002, FloodCode,
dClosed1999, Square_FtSqrd, dFireplace1G,
GarageCap3, PerPassAll, dClosed2001, dTotBath3G,
LotSize_SF, dClosed2000, Square_FT
a. 
ANOVAb
281.267 18 15.626 186.932 .000a
67.291 805 .084
348.558 823
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), ViewCode, dClosed2004, LotSize_SFSqrd,
dTotBath2p5, dClosed2003, DistFrCityCtr_Miles, dClosed2002,
FloodCode, dClosed1999, Square_FtSqrd, dFireplace1G, GarageCap3,
PerPassAll, dClosed2001, dTotBath3G, LotSize_SF, dClosed2000,
Square_FT
a. 
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPriceb. 
Coefficientsa
10.904 .162 67.120 .000
-.029498616 .0028999292 -.167 -10.172 .000
6.233E-06 .0000007288 .299 8.553 .000
-5.830E-12 .0000000000 -.142 -4.380 .000
6.397E-05 .0000346311 .118 1.847 .065
1.346E-08 .0000000043 .190 3.134 .002
.2466389089 .0797734514 .136 3.092 .002
.3513266917 .0777085549 .246 4.521 .000
.4838399858 .0780284011 .328 6.201 .000
.4983504476 .0814263142 .244 6.120 .000
.4320537471 .0829460437 .190 5.209 .000
.3316369599 .0863281540 .129 3.842 .000
.1307745595 .0303973498 .094 4.302 .000
.4167504658 .0364835659 .319 11.423 .000
.3523336601 .0347044113 .181 10.152 .000
.1196819381 .0288630292 .079 4.147 .000
.0060537857 .0016689583 .070 3.627 .000
-.403053822 .0505938537 -.144 -7.966 .000
.2201346137 .0243283725 .169 9.048 .000
(Constant)
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
LotSize_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
Square_FT
Square_FtSqrd
dClosed1999
dClosed2000
dClosed2001
dClosed2002
dClosed2003
dClosed2004
dTotBath2p5
dTotBath3G
dFireplace1G
GarageCap3
PerPassAll
FloodCode
ViewCode
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPricea. 
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Table 16: Final Hedonic Model 
Model Summary
.903a .816 .811 .2832638722430
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score   5 for
analysis 1, REGR factor score   4 for analysis 1, REGR
factor score   3 for analysis 1, REGR factor score   2 for
analysis 1, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 1,
dClosed2001, LotSize_SFSqrd, dTotBath2p5,
dClosed2004, dClosed2003, ViewCode, dClosed2002,
Square_FtSqrd, DistFrCityCtr_Miles, dFireplace1G,
dClosed1999, FloodCode, GarageCap3, PerPassAll,
dTotBath3G, LotSize_SF, dClosed2000, Square_FT
a. 
ANOVAb
284.368 23 12.364 154.088 .000a
64.191 800 .080
348.558 823
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score   5 for analysis 1, REGR factor
score   4 for analysis 1, REGR factor score   3 for analysis 1, REGR factor
score   2 for analysis 1, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 1,
dClosed2001, LotSize_SFSqrd, dTotBath2p5, dClosed2004,
dClosed2003, ViewCode, dClosed2002, Square_FtSqrd, DistFrCityCtr_
Miles, dFireplace1G, dClosed1999, FloodCode, GarageCap3,
PerPassAll, dTotBath3G, LotSize_SF, dClosed2000, Square_FT
a. 
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPriceb. 
Coefficientsa
11.020 .169 65.149 .000
-.0309500281 .0029622654 -.175 -10.448 .000
6.108E-06 .0000007157 .293 8.534 .000
-5.806E-12 .0000000000 -.142 -4.444 .000
4.127E-05 .0000343849 .076 1.200 .230
1.560E-08 .0000000042 .220 3.671 .000
.2752026733 .0785955213 .152 3.502 .000
.3894610639 .0767227486 .272 5.076 .000
.5111802275 .0768393011 .346 6.653 .000
.5182444553 .0801242216 .253 6.468 .000
.4803261760 .0818941289 .211 5.865 .000
.3892518346 .0857512445 .152 4.539 .000
.1342189379 .0298551719 .097 4.496 .000
.3934220306 .0360705950 .301 10.907 .000
.3522469959 .0346015952 .181 10.180 .000
.1122303372 .0286028376 .074 3.924 .000
.0051692783 .0017671397 .060 2.925 .004
-.3112174022 .0528726931 -.111 -5.886 .000
.2111103744 .0241408497 .162 8.745 .000
.0397971751 .0109095250 .061 3.648 .000
-.0516646182 .0114558375 -.079 -4.510 .000
-.0227611049 .0125279950 -.035 -1.817 .070
-.0292688242 .0102369244 -.045 -2.859 .004
-.0064500378 .0100598418 -.010 -.641 .522
(Constant)
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
LotSize_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
Square_FT
Square_FtSqrd
dClosed1999
dClosed2000
dClosed2001
dClosed2002
dClosed2003
dClosed2004
dTotBath2p5
dTotBath3G
dFireplace1G
GarageCap3
PerPassAll
FloodCode
ViewCode
REGR factor score 
1 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
2 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
3 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
4 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
5 for analysis 1
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPricea.  
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Table 17: Regression Model with dGreen Rating and Energy Factors 
Model Summary
.904a .817 .811 .2828416697958
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), dGreen, ViewCode, REGR
factor score   4 for analysis 1, REGR factor score   5 for
analysis 1, REGR factor score   3 for analysis 1,
LotSize_SFSqrd, dClosed2001, dTotBath2p5, REGR
factor score   2 for analysis 1, dFireplace1G,
dClosed2003, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 1,
dClosed2002, Square_FtSqrd, DistFrCityCtr_Miles,
dClosed1999, dClosed2004, FloodCode,
GarageCap3, PerPassAll, dTotBath3G, LotSize_SF,
dClosed2000, Square_FT
a. 
ANOVAb
284.639 24 11.860 148.250 .000a
63.920 799 .080
348.558 823
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), dGreen, ViewCode, REGR factor score   4 for
analysis 1, REGR factor score   5 for analysis 1, REGR factor score   3 for
analysis 1, LotSize_SFSqrd, dClosed2001, dTotBath2p5, REGR factor
score   2 for analysis 1, dFireplace1G, dClosed2003, REGR factor score 
1 for analysis 1, dClosed2002, Square_FtSqrd, DistFrCityCtr_Miles,
dClosed1999, dClosed2004, FloodCode, GarageCap3, PerPassAll,
dTotBath3G, LotSize_SF, dClosed2000, Square_FT
a. 
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPriceb. 
Coefficientsa
11.029 .169 65.272 .000
-.0306646026 .0029619096 -.174 -10.353 .000
6.087E-06 .0000007147 .292 8.516 .000
-5.764E-12 .0000000000 -.140 -4.418 .000
4.016E-05 .0000343389 .074 1.169 .243
1.585E-08 .0000000042 .224 3.733 .000
.2738815597 .0784816554 .152 3.490 .001
.3861275018 .0766297851 .270 5.039 .000
.5078334939 .0767463006 .344 6.617 .000
.5157348958 .0800164063 .252 6.445 .000
.4778096017 .0817834883 .210 5.842 .000
.3819129038 .0857161568 .149 4.456 .000
.1324409428 .0298263092 .095 4.440 .000
.3902854060 .0360570973 .298 10.824 .000
.3507590723 .0345594713 .180 10.149 .000
.1131290459 .0285643759 .075 3.960 .000
.0050259236 .0017662227 .058 2.846 .005
-.3096163533 .0528010474 -.110 -5.864 .000
.2112772532 .0241050384 .162 8.765 .000
.0414603236 .0109306508 .064 3.793 .000
-.0525655933 .0114492244 -.081 -4.591 .000
-.0218835832 .0125183977 -.034 -1.748 .081
-.0289271069 .0102233510 -.044 -2.830 .005
-.0071273980 .0100515821 -.011 -.709 .478
.0559332208 .0303781772 .028 1.841 .066
(Constant)
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
LotSize_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
Square_FT
Square_FtSqrd
dClosed1999
dClosed2000
dClosed2001
dClosed2002
dClosed2003
dClosed2004
dTotBath2p5
dTotBath3G
dFireplace1G
GarageCap3
PerPassAll
FloodCode
ViewCode
REGR factor score 
1 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
2 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
3 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
4 for analysis 1
REGR factor score 
5 for analysis 1
dGreen
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPricea.  
 73
Table 18: Descriptive Statistics for Homes with no Energy Features 
Descriptive Statistics
254 1.08 21.22 11.017 3.609
254 3,289 155,466 14,872.756 18,702.646
254 10,817,521 24,169,677,156 569,610,714.693 2,195,321,896.654
254 929 7,456 2,780.941 1,077.319
254 863,041 55,591,936 8,889,678.555 8,284,768.069
254 0 1 .173 .379
254 0 1 .335 .473
254 0 1 .303 .461
254 0 1 .087 .282
254 0 1 .059 .236
254 0 1 .039 .195
254 0 1 .354 .479
254 0 1 .413 .493
254 0 1 .181 .386
254 60 94 88.634 5.028
254 0 1 .020 .139
254 11.184 14.431 12.545 .597
254 72,000 1,850,000 340,194.681 254,782.455
254
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
LotSize_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
Square_FT
Square_FtSqrd
dClosed1999
dClosed2000
dClosed2001
dClosed2002
dClosed2003
dClosed2004
dTotBath2p5
dTotBath3G
GarageCap3
PerPassAll
FloodCode
LnSalesPrice
SalesPrice
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
 
 
Table 19: Descriptive Statistics for Homes with at Least One Energy Feature 
Descriptive Statistics
570 1.74 24.66 10.963 3.720
570 3,023 665,335 17,664.704 35,331.681
570 9,138,529 442,670,662,225 1,558,179,361.707 19,012,348,190.667
570 940 9,410 2,749.318 1,254.584
570 883,600 88,548,100 9,129,965.767 9,581,404.041
570 0 1 .144 .351
570 0 1 .274 .446
570 0 1 .246 .431
570 0 1 .126 .332
570 0 1 .104 .305
570 0 1 .082 .275
570 0 1 .314 .465
570 0 1 .463 .499
570 0 1 .275 .447
570 60 94 85.707 8.219
570 0 1 .074 .261
570 11.313 15.124 12.544 .674
570 81,890 3,700,000 364,450.761 360,415.063
570
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
LotSize_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
Square_FT
Square_FtSqrd
dClosed1999
dClosed2000
dClosed2001
dClosed2002
dClosed2003
dClosed2004
dTotBath2p5
dTotBath3G
GarageCap3
PerPassAll
FloodCode
LnSalesPrice
SalesPrice
Valid N (listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
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• Duct Work  
• Earth-Sheltered Design  
• Energy-Efficient Appliances  
• Energy Recovery Ventilators  
• Energy Saving Landscapes 
• Insulation 
• Lighting 
• Natural Daylighting 
• Passive Solar Design 
• Photovoltaic Systems 
• Radiant Barriers, Ridge, & Soffit Venting 
• Solar Water Heating & Space Heating 
• Ventilation Fans 
• Water Heating 
Table 20: Green Building Program Energy Features 
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Table 21: Regression for Austin Homes with at least one Energy Feature 
Model Summary
.917a .840 .833 .2750158715440
Model
1
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score   5 for
analysis 2, REGR factor score   4 for analysis 2, REGR
factor score   3 for analysis 2, REGR factor score   2 for
analysis 2, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 2,
LotSize_SFSqrd, dClosed2001, dTotBath2p5,
dClosed1999, dClosed2004, dClosed2003, Square_
FtSqrd, VIEWCODE, dClosed2002, DistFrCityCtr_
Miles, dFireplace1G, FLOODCODE, GarageCap3,
PERPASSALL, dTotBath3G, LOTSIZE_SF,
dClosed2000, SQUARE FT
a. 
                
ANOVAb
217.075 23 9.438 124.786 .000a
41.296 546 .076
258.371 569
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score   5 for analysis 2, REGR factor
score   4 for analysis 2, REGR factor score   3 for analysis 2, REGR factor
score   2 for analysis 2, REGR factor score   1 for analysis 2, LotSize_
SFSqrd, dClosed2001, dTotBath2p5, dClosed1999, dClosed2004,
dClosed2003, Square_FtSqrd, VIEWCODE, dClosed2002, DistFrCityCtr_
Miles, dFireplace1G, FLOODCODE, GarageCap3, PERPASSALL,
dTotBath3G, LOTSIZE_SF, dClosed2000, SQUARE_FT
a. 
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPriceb. 
Coefficientsa
11.255 .184 61.163 .000
-.0289038492 .0037624435 -.160 -7.682 .000
6.620E-06 .0000008192 .347 8.081 .000
-6.540E-12 .0000000000 -.185 -4.593 .000
6.176E-05 .0000392919 .115 1.572 .117
1.451E-08 .0000000048 .206 3.048 .002
.2434346960 .0809899693 .127 3.006 .003
.3450046848 .0783007515 .228 4.406 .000
.4612400696 .0784038956 .295 5.883 .000
.4419327191 .0818209476 .218 5.401 .000
.4628904799 .0837414572 .209 5.528 .000
.3518536101 .0896079325 .144 3.927 .000
.1067748126 .0349193818 .074 3.058 .002
.3622029737 .0433813789 .268 8.349 .000
.2968256904 .0442534746 .147 6.707 .000
.0801851918 .0337489289 .053 2.376 .018
.0030694323 .0020020109 .037 1.533 .126
-.2874449280 .0566682853 -.112 -5.072 .000
.1812121690 .0292646621 .134 6.192 .000
.0954076908 .0144188476 .142 6.617 .000
-.0433423147 .0132074807 -.064 -3.282 .001
-.0350599822 .0153499642 -.052 -2.284 .023
.0058487212 .0126256362 .009 .463 .643
.0063534096 .0118619662 .009 .536 .592
(Constant)
DistFrCityCtr_Miles
LOTSIZE_SF
LotSize_SFSqrd
SQUARE_FT
Square_FtSqrd
dClosed1999
dClosed2000
dClosed2001
dClosed2002
dClosed2003
dClosed2004
dTotBath2p5
dTotBath3G
dFireplace1G
GarageCap3
PERPASSALL
FLOODCODE
VIEWCODE
REGR factor score 
1 for analysis 2
REGR factor score 
2 for analysis 2
REGR factor score 
3 for analysis 2
REGR factor score 
4 for analysis 2
REGR factor score 
5 for analysis 2
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: LnSalesPricea.  
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Total Variance Explained
1.989 19.887 19.887 1.989 19.887 19.887 1.823 18.228 18.228
1.502 15.019 34.905 1.502 15.019 34.905 1.467 14.672 32.900
1.226 12.258 47.163 1.226 12.258 47.163 1.361 13.609 46.509
1.087 10.867 58.030 1.087 10.867 58.030 1.135 11.351 57.860
1.003 10.034 68.064 1.003 10.034 68.064 1.020 10.204 68.064
.929 9.286 77.350
.760 7.599 84.949
.583 5.830 90.780
.509 5.092 95.872
.413 4.128 100.000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22: Principal Component Analysis for Homes with at Least One Energy Feature 
Table 23: Variable Loadings on Components
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       Table 24: Green Building Program Stars for a Green Rating 
STARS
722 87.6 87.6
14 1.7 89.3
81 9.8 99.2
7 .8 100.0
824 100.0
0
1
2
3
Total
Valid
Frequency Percent
Cumulative
Percent
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